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ABSTRACT 
 The way in which political parties in the United States choose to nominate 
presidential candidates is a dynamic process. States operate with a great deal of autonomy 
as to when and what type of contest to hold, strategic candidates seek to enter the race at 
an advantageous time, and voters adjust to the electoral environment. The movement of 
state contests earlier in the calendar and the quick conclusion that is often reached before 
the official nominating convention has lead to a compression of the nomination contest. 
This compression of the presidential nomination contest has altered the dynamic structure 
that underlies the decisions made by states in terms of scheduling their contests. 
 I utilize compression as a chief independent variable in three empirical analyses, 
assessing its impact over time to the key actors in a nomination campaign. Using data 
compiled from FEC candidate filling, I use a robust regression model to demonstrate a 
correlation between state movement of contests and candidate disbursements in that state. 
Next I explore the impact of compression on candidate entry into the nomination race 
using a log-logistical model of duration to test a unique data set of political, 
environmental and candidate qualities. I demonstrate the viability of these findings in a 
case study analysis of the 1984 Democratic and 2008 Republican nomination campaigns, 
before presenting a logit analysis gauging the familiarity with challengers that front-
runner supporters demonstrate in those same contests in the final empirical chapter. 
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CHAPTER I  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Recent presidential nomination campaigns have looked different than those 
preceding them. Voting takes place earlier, states compete with one another for influence, 
and candidates raise and spend money at previously unheard of levels. This dissertation is 
an effort to better understand how these changes have an impact. As the statewide 
contests that compose the race for the presidential nomination cluster earlier in the 
process, I seek to more fully understand how this evolutionary change has affected the 
most pivotal actors in the system. Norrander (2000) suggests that we must frequently 
update our understanding of presidential nominations, as it is a dynamic process in which 
candidates and states seek to gain an advantage by making persistent changes to it. It is 
therefore incumbent upon scholars to attempt and explain how the changes in the 
structure of electoral competition and the timing of contests have altered our 
understanding of this process.  
 In the contemporary era1 of presidential nomination campaigns, we have seen the 
timing and the structure of competition change substantially between the early post-
reform period of 1972-1984 and the more frontloaded era of 1988-2008. The movement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The contemporary era begins with the 1972 Democratic Nomination, the first in which the majority of the 
delegates to the national convention were selected through primary elections and open caucuses.  
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of state contests earlier in the nomination calendar2 and the quick conclusion that is often 
reached before the official nominating convention has lead to a compression of the 
nomination contest. In the following pages, I test the effects of this compression on the 
behavior of the states and the candidates seeking their party’s nomination. These are the 
two actors who under the relative restriction of party rules, can be most influential in 
making the structural changes to the nomination system (Kamarck 2009).  
 Unlike the general election, the system of nominating presidential candidates in 
the United States has not remained stable over time. While the general election campaign 
may look very different throughout the years, the basic structure of the Electoral College 
is rooted in the constitution (Roche 1961). Controlled by political parties and without a 
constitutional foundation, nominations utilize processes reflective of the political context 
for the times in which they take place, thereby changing to serve the interests of key 
actors. Most significant of these changes to the nomination system occurred in the 
aftermath of the turbulent 1968 Democratic National Convention3, after which time the 
selection of presidential candidates has moved away from the convention or mixed 
systems into one of open elections4 at the state level. This decentralized appeal to the 
electorate in its contemporary incarnation has seen many minor revisions and alterations 
since the first primary-centered nomination campaign of 1972.  This shifting dynamic 
requires modern scholars to seek insight into the system, as it exists contemporarily, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The nomination calendar describes the time of the year in which states are allowed under party rules to 
hold a primary or caucus to select delegates to the party’s national convention. 3	  The Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection was created to study creating a more 
inclusive process of selecting delegates and thus candidates to the Democratic National Convention. The 
recommendations of what came to be known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission after its chairs, serve as 
the basis for reforms in both parties that lead to a process by which voter preference leads convention 
delegate selection. These reforms began in earnest with the 1972 contest.  4	  Party caucuses vary in the method in which they are conducted and as such are not technically elections. 
They are however governed by rules in both parties that require them to public events.  
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political actors bend the system for their own strategic and self-interested purposes. The 
central query of this research is discerning if the growing compression of statewide 
contests from 1980-2008 and the emphasis of events at the front of the nomination 
campaign, has resulted in a demonstrably altered electoral environment. In order to 
effectively pursue this end, it is necessary to examine how the voters’ perceptions of 
candidates have changed as the nomination campaign has become further compressed. 
 There are three distinct phases of a nomination campaign, all of which occur 
before the parties gather for their official nominating conventions (Norrander 2000). The 
first is the invisible primary, where potential candidates compile resources both political 
and financial, which are necessary for sustaining a campaign. Second is the competitive 
phase, in which multiple candidates are engaged in active campaigning and participating 
in statewide contests. Third is when the last remaining candidate secures delegates in 
non-competitive contests in which he or she is the only one still actively engaged in 
running for the party’s nomination. The third phase is contingent upon the candidates 
who are behind in pledged delegates suspending campaign activities prior to the 
nominating convention and is referred to as the “mop-up phase”(Adkins and Dowdle 
2001). While not a given, the nominee of both major parties has been known prior to the 
nominating convention in every nomination campaign after 19845. 
 In order to best understand the changes that fall under the scope of “compression” 
let us start with a discussion of the competitive portion of contemporary nomination 
campaign. This period is shorter in duration than those of the early post-reform period as 
illustrated in Table1.1. Concurrently, there has been a strong and persistent movement of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The 2008 Democratic contest between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama officially ended with a floor 
vote at the Democratic National Convention	  however that vote was symbolic in nature and Clinton had 
agreed to endorse Obama prior to the convention (Southwell 2010) 
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states holding their contests closer to the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary, 
which are granted the exclusive right to go first by party rule. Iowa and New Hampshire, 
respectively, have moved their contests earlier and earlier in the nomination campaign in 
order to maintain a near exclusive hold on the media coverage, candidate attention and 
perhaps policy concessions that come with that position (Adams 1987).  Statewide 
contests around the early portion of the nomination calendar have become more frequent 
as the first in the nation caucus and primary have become an entrenched part of 
nomination campaigns.  
Table 1.1  
Compression of the Nomination Calendar 
 
Iowa Caucuses Days from NH Days From Super 
Tuesday 
Super 
Tuesday 
Contests 
1980 (D) & (R) 1/21/80 36 - - 
1984 (D) 2/20/84 8 - 5* 
1988 (D) 2/8/88 8 28 21 
1988 (R) 2/8/88 8 28 17 
1992 (D) 2/10/92 8 28 12 
1996 (R) 2/12/96 8 28 7 
2000 (D) 1/24/00 8 42 13 
2000 (R) 1/24/00 8 42 13 
2004 (D) 1/19/04 8 42 10 
2008 (D) 1/3/08 5 33 23 
2008 (R) 1/3/08 5 33 21 
*  The 5 states clustered together early expressed no formal intent to do so 
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Figure 1.1 
Delegations Decided by Super Tuesday
 
 
 Subsequent to the shortening of the period between the first in the nation caucus 
and primary there is also considerably less time until the contests in each subsequent 
nomination campaign cycle. Where there were once weeks for the results of Iowa and 
New Hampshire to reverberate through the political world, there are now merely a few 
days. In the winter of 1968, Eugene McCarty used the well-placed first in the nation New 
Hampshire primary to hurtle his antiwar candidacy into the mainstream of American 
politics. This was an instrumental moment in that nomination campaign, in part because 
it was the only primary held on or before March of that year. Contrast this with the 
protracted struggle waged by Senators Clinton and Obama in 2008, where more than half 
the states had weighed in with their contests by Valentine’s Day. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, 
the quantity of races that encompass the early portion of the calendar now account for a 
majority of the delegations needed to win the nomination. The last of the office-seeking 
candidates is routinely out of the race by early March, leaving only the front-runner to 
mop up the remaining delegates. In Table 1.2 we observe the length of the competitive 
phase of each nomination contest since 1980 and the number of non-competitive contests 
in the mop-up phase. The frequent presence of relatively large numbers of contests that 
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fall within the mop-up phase of the nomination campaign presents an inherent dilemma 
for states that schedule contests later in the process. A statewide contest conducted late in 
the nomination calendar, especially in a delegate rich state, could prove potentially 
decisive and as such receive the undivided attention of the candidates for a period of time. 
However, it is more likely than not that the race will already be decided on or shortly 
after Super Tuesday. Over the years many states have chosen instead to move their 
contests forward in the calendar, to ensure participation in the competitive phase of the 
nomination campaign. 
Table 1.2 
Clinching the Nomination since 1980 
 
Year Party Nominee Clinched Remaining Primaries 
1980 Democratic Carter Convention 0 
1980 Republican Reagan Convention 0 
1984 Democratic Mondale Convention 0 
1988 Democratic Dukakis 4/20/1988 13 
1988 Republican Bush 3/29/1988 15 
1992 Democratic Clinton 3/19/1992 23 
1996 Republican Dole 3/13/1996 20 
2000 Democratic Gore 3/8/2000 24 
2000 Democratic W. Bush 3/8/2000 25 
2004 Democratic Kerry 3/3/2004 17 
2008 Democratic Obama Convention 0 
2008 Republican McCain 3/4/2008 10 
2012 Republican Romney 4/7/2012 17 
 
 The compression of the nomination campaign does not allow for extended periods 
of campaigning between contests early in the calendar (Figure 1.2). Even as candidates 
pursue early state success, they must focus on running what they hope will be a 
nationwide effort concurrent with their early state strategy, or at least shortly there after. 
Once the voting commences, the nomination campaign moves very quickly to a 
conclusion and with rare exception, it reaches one before the formal roll is taken at the 
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party’s nominating convention. The competitive phase of the nomination contest will not 
routinely reach every state.  
 Candidates have to employ their resources strategically and cannot always 
compete in with equal vigor in every statewide contest. Political factors, scarce financial 
resources and a lack of available time require candidates to make choices as to where 
their efforts are best spent. Choices that have become more difficult in recent cycles as 
more states have moved their contests closer to the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire 
primary. States that have not moved their contests forward and sit at or near the back of 
the nomination calendar, risk falling into the nomination campaign’s mop-up phase. 
Voters in mop-up states do not see a campaign and are not privy to the same mobilization 
efforts as their peers in the pivotal battleground states. These factors place those states 
that are not advantaged like Iowa and New Hampshire, in a precarious position if they 
wish to impact the nomination of the major party candidates. They may move forward 
and further compress the nomination calendar or risk falling into irrelevancy for that 
nomination campaign cycle and not see an active campaign within their state. 
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Figure 1.2  
Frontloading Primaries 
Primaries Contested by Month 1980-2008 
 
  
 Just as some states are more advantaged than others when it comes to choosing a 
nominee, nomination campaigns are rarely if ever contested by candidates who are on 
equal footing. Front-runners6, often advantaged over their counterparts in terms of 
funding, experience, endorsements, and proliferation of staffing talent, are better 
positioned to navigate the system regardless of how it might be structured. Non-front-
runner candidates who are not sufficiently advantaged in these areas are trying 
desperately to catch up over the course of the nomination campaign. The compression of 
the calendar would seemingly makes this a more difficult undertaking, as there are results 
from statewide contests that are being interpreted by the media and potential donors, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  During the invisible primary a front-runner is considered the candidate leading in the major national polls 
and having a fundraising advantage of any kind over the nearest competitor. During the competitive phase 
of the nomination campaign it is the candidate leading in pledged delegates.  
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delegates awarded that move some candidates closer to their goal of the nomination in a 
shorter amount of time. 
 The heightened uneven competition in the sequential statewide contests post New 
Hampshire, has the potential to negate any gain that a state might make by moving its 
contest forward in the nomination calendar. Candidates with ample resources are able to 
compete in a wide range of contests. Those candidates with limited resources are left to 
make difficult decisions as to where they are able to most effectively compete. With a 
large number of contests moved earlier in the calendar, and in some instances occurring 
simultaneous to those in other states, it creates a difficult challenge for candidates that 
lack adequate financial resources, a network of surrogates, and full delegate slates. When 
there are so many states holding contests on the same day or in rapid succession, 
candidates must decide where to strategically employ their resources in order to best 
compete. As a result, the context of the campaign varies from state to state as the 
candidates court different constituencies and ignore others (Gurian and Haynes 1993). 
 Strategically, as candidates employ their resources in advantageous ways within 
the context of the nomination campaign, their decisions shape the potential electorate in a 
state through a mobilization or demobilization of potential voters. The opportunity of 
voting for a candidate and the information presented to voters differs substantially 
depending on where a voter lives and the decision her state and others have made in 
scheduling their contests, in addition to the aforementioned strategic approach that the 
candidates have employed. The context of the campaign matters when determining the 
structure of electoral competition. 
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 In Iowa and New Hampshire, voters are presented with a full slate of candidates 
who aggressively seek their vote and encourage their participation. Candidate’s campaign 
activities are varied and personal communication from their campaign to potential voters 
is not only commonplace but also an expected norm. This style of electioneering has been 
described as “retail” politics. It is a very labor-intensive process that takes up a large 
portion of a candidate’s time and efforts during the invisible primary. As there is no limit 
to when a candidates campaign for the nomination can begin, candidates are able to 
employ a retail political strategy in these states months and sometimes more than a year 
before any vote is cast. Early states are privy to campaign activities from a full slate of 
candidates for a lengthy period of time, and then privileged to receive a disproportionate 
amount of attention from the press that diligently covers the start of this process (Bartels 
1988). The media attention is intense and constant early in the process and then falls off 
as the presumptive nominee becomes more certain and latter contests no longer 
substantially threaten to change this outcome (Sheehan 1983). It falls off in the most 
pronounced fashion for those candidates who fail to make significant progress towards 
the nomination by securing delegates in the states where contests have occurred.  
 While New Hampshire has a long tradition of early presidential politicking, 
candidates for the nomination now spend a good deal of time in the first caucus state as 
well. In 1972, of the six declared Democratic candidates only three campaigned in Iowa 
and for a total of seven days between them. In 2008, the seven Democratic candidates 
averaged more than thirty-two days in the state beginning the year prior. This active and 
concentrated campaign in both Iowa and New Hampshire concurrently are distinct from 
the other 48 state contests in that they are open-ended and institutionalized. Candidates 
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who are considering their party’s nomination for the presidency are aware that whatever 
political maneuvering occurs between the national party committees and other states has 
had no affect on the positioning of those first two states on the nomination calendar. Thus 
when they ultimately decide to launch even a preliminary campaign organization, they 
are able to do so in those states with little fear of sunk cost and, more importantly, as 
early as they see fit. Being that there is no formal or legal beginning to the nomination 
campaign, strategic candidates understand that many key activists and party officials in 
Iowa and New Hampshire commit early to candidates and rarely sit out a nomination 
cycle (Redlawsk et al. 2009). Campaign dynamics in these pivotal states favor early and 
persistent attention from candidates.   
 Early contests shape momentum. Candidates who defy expectations receive praise 
from the media and party activists that they can translate into future support both 
financially and in terms of votes in subsequent statewide contests (Bartels 1985 and1988; 
Hagen and Mayer 2000). Serious office seeking candidates without front-runner 
advantages have little choice but to engage in a strategy placing a heavy emphasis on 
early success. The experience of past nomination campaigns offers only a momentum-
based strategy as a potential route to the nomination for such candidates (Norrander 
1996).  
 Historically some candidates have chosen to forego a momentum-based strategy 
and campaign in states that are rich in delegates, or in some measure more favorable to 
their candidacy. On the surface such a strategy of delegate seeking seems strategically 
optimal as New Hampshire and Iowa have relatively few of the delegates required7 to win 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  New Hampshire supplied neither party with even 1% of the total delegates to their convention in 2008 
and the largest delegation sent in the post-reform era was 1.1% of the delegates to the Republican National 
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the nomination.  Experience has shown that such a strategy is folly, with the media 
spotlight on the successful candidates in New Hampshire and Iowa the dynamics change 
rapidly and overtake even the strongest candidates.  Morris Udall in 1976, and Rudolph 
Giuliani in 2008, two one time party front-runners, both attempted to forgo the retail 
politicking of the early states and instead campaign in larger states with later primaries. 
The idea of pressing their financial advantages and downplaying the significance of the 
results of Iowa and New Hampshire, would make sense if not for the importance placed 
on the states from other sources. Congressman Morris Udall felt the New Hampshire 
primary “no more important than that of any other state” and spent little time there, 
instead choosing to travel to the more populous states of Illinois and Florida (Udall 2001). 
Despite favorable prospects in those states prior to the initial contests, and the fact that 
Iowa and later New Hampshire surprise winner Jimmy Carter had spent no time in either 
place, Carter riding a wave of good press from his early success carried both. A frustrated 
Udall left the race soon after (Ibid).  
 A similar experience befell former New York City Mayor and Republican front-
runner Rudolph Giuliani in 2008, when he suspended campaign activities in both Iowa 
and New Hampshire weeks before those contests took place and began campaigning full 
time in Florida. Despite at one time leading the field in that state by 26 points8 Giuliani 
suffered a substantial defeat and withdrew from the race without earning a single delegate. 
Both of these party heavyweights failed to achieve the nomination and were left 
frustrated with the way in which the media portrayed the race after the early state contests 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Convention. Iowa supplied neither party with even 2% of the total delegates to their convention in 2008 
and the largest delegation sent in the post-reform era was 1.9% of the delegates to the same Republican 
National Convention of 1980.  8	  CNN/Gallup Poll of likely Republican voters in the Florida Presidential Primary 9/25/2007 
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(Ceaser 1979; Belt et al. 2012). Without a successful example of a nominee that has been 
able to bypass the early states, strategic candidates must seek the path to the nomination 
through those pivotal contests, with front-runners trying to meet expectations and 
challengers seeking to capture momentum. 
 A failure to achieve momentum leads to further winnowing of the field, as serious 
office-seeking candidates have no realistic path to the nomination. Each statewide contest 
subsequent to those initial results, further alters the dynamic of the campaign rewarding 
winners or perceived winners with momentum, and punishing losers with less attention 
from party activists and the media when they fail to achieve it. As the field is winnowed 
and a narrative set into place, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a deviant outcome in 
one state to become an influential cue to future states or to the political press covering the 
race (Haynes and Murray 1998; Norrander 2000).  
 The results of elections occurring in sequence alter the nomination campaign as 
they occur. One of the key functions of a nomination campaign is to demonstrate to the 
party base that the candidate who emerges the winner, is viable to win the general 
election (Ceaser 1979; Aldrich 1980). As candidates face diverse electorates in various 
states, their viability can be demonstrated or brought into question. In an earlier era, this 
was the sole function of a presidential primary. To contest a primary in a geographical 
region or where certain demographic groups, or political factor are present that might be 
underrepresented in that candidate’s home state. A candidate could demonstrate to the 
party officials and voting delegates at the convention that they are electable by 
succeeding in these more challenging contests. This was an important feature during the 
“mixed system” of primaries and convention deliberation. The most famous case 
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occurred when Massachusetts Catholic John Kennedy defeated establishment favorite 
Hubert Humphrey in the heavily protestant 1960 West Virginia primary (White 1961). In 
the contemporary era, the demonstration effect is not for the delegates at the convention 
but rather for the news media and electorates in subsequent states. Candidates seek to 
establish their positive momentum with the results from the first contests. The self-
reinforcing notion of momentum accelerates the exit of candidates without the resources 
and name recognition to compete with better-financed opponents. There are few if any 
opportunities for insurgent candidates to capture momentum outside of those initial 
contests, and most candidates are not able to sustain their campaigns financially without 
the boost of an early victory (Hinckley and Green 1996; Mutz 1995: Knight and Schiff 
2010). 
 The early states in the process benefit greatly from the contemporary dynamics 
discussed previously, where as the states that go later in the sequence could be harmed by 
them. Fewer candidates, less time for a campaign and subsequently receiving less 
attention from the news media make the prospect of holding a contest later in the 
nomination campaign a far less attractive proposition for states. Being that states have 
wide autonomy in selecting when they can hold their nomination contests, there has been 
a tendency to move earlier in the process, creating the compressed calendar that serves as 
the point of inquiry here. Since the 1988 campaign, “frontloading” has become more 
pervasive. Concurrent to this, there have been advances in communications technology, a 
fragmentation of the media environment, increasing polarization between the parties, 
regulation and deregulation of campaign finance and an increasingly nationalized 
political environment that have placed new pressures on presidential candidates (Aldrich 
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and Alvarez 1994; Claibourn 2008; Kendell 2000; Morris and Francia 2010; Rothenberg 
and Brady 1988; Thompson 2010).  
 The need to capture momentum in early contests is an established norm adhered 
to by serious office seeking candidates, regardless of their initial status. In recent 
nomination campaign cycles, the period of time in which momentum might take hold 
with voters and the media has shrank. The compression of the nomination campaign has 
placed a great premium on early victory and increased the pressure on states to hold their 
contests during this pivotal time. Does this pressure for early success impact the decision 
of candidates outside the front-runner to enter the nomination race? Do states really 
benefit? Are voters full aware of alternatives to the front-runner by the time they are 
required to make a choice?   
Shifting Dynamics of Competition 
 Much scholarly work on the subject of presidential nomination campaigns in the 
post-reform period focuses on the invisible primary, and the determinative strengths of 
candidates preceding any voting taking place. Sterger (2008) and Aldrich (2009) have 
demonstrated that no single variable is ultimately predictive of candidate success. Rather 
factors such as campaign organization, fundraising and fundraising potential, showing in 
national and state level public opinion polls as well as elite endorsements are all 
important indicators of how a candidate will perform. From this perspective, the 
nomination campaigns themselves are not determinative, but rather the affirmation of 
strong and strategically successful politicians who created the factors that lead to their 
successful pursuit of the nomination over the course of their careers generally and in the 
run up to the nomination campaign that cycle specifically. 
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 If the candidates fundamental strengths entering the nomination campaign are of 
principal importance then that leaves little room for a lesser-known candidate to win the 
nomination. Yet time and again we have witnessed “dark horse” candidates emerge and 
capture if not the nomination, the attention of the party faithful. Momentum is a very real 
phenomenon, that is key for candidates to emerge from the pack and compete for the 
nomination. Winning in New Hampshire, for instance, allows the victorious candidate to 
demonstrate his or her viability through increased fundraising, larger campaign staffs, 
increased name recognition and better subsequent performance in public opinion polling 
(Gurian 1990; Jackson and Crotty 1996; Mutz 1995). Media coverage after winning 
unexpectedly or over-performing expectations in a statewide contest has a demonstrable 
positive impact on candidate resources (Aldrich 1980; Brady 1983).  
 Over the course of the nomination campaign, candidates find their resources 
increase after victories, as do their chances of securing the nomination. Voters in 
subsequent statewide contests are more receptive to previous winners, and they gain 
greater support as a result (Bartels 1988; Popkin 1991; Kenny and Rice 1994; Mutz 1997). 
Momentum is the only proven way for a candidate without the structural advantages of a 
front-runner to hope to win the nomination. Momentum candidates are able to stay in the 
race and compete independent of how poorly they matched up to the front-runner during 
the invisible primary period (Gurian 1986; Bartels 1988; Damore 1997).   
 There has been a litany of different measures used to gauge candidate strength, 
though the greatest predictive power is found with national polling numbers and total 
fundraising prior to the first vote cast. As the McGovern-Frasier era reforms have become 
institutionalized, this has proven the most successful set of measures in predicting the 
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eventual nominee, in no small part because each in some way represent establishment 
preference. The invisible primary front-runner has come to be defined as the candidate 
who is leading in both the final national Gallup poll of party identifiers’ preferences for 
their nominee, and in total fundraising prior to the election year. On ten occasions from 
1980-2000, the same candidate led both indicators and went on to win his party’s 
nomination (Mayer 1996, 2003). Twice those predictive indicators diverged and a 
candidate ahead in one of them won their party’s nomination in both instances. Though 
Carter’s 1976 insurgency campaign for the Democratic Party’s nomination has served as 
the model for many a lesser-known candidate since, there is little to suggest that 
momentum candidates actually win elections. Even the 2008 victory of Barack Obama 
would be difficult to classify as momentum based given the candidate’s invisible primary 
fundraising performance relative to past challengers.  
 The frontloading that began in 1988 did not appear to alter this dynamic. In fact, 
frontloading did not affect the outcome of any nomination contest between 1980 and 
2004, the factors having created front-running candidates during the invisible primary 
were what ultimately proved determinative (Wattier 2005). While the compression of the 
nomination campaign at the front of the calendar shortens the amount of time in which a 
nominee is chosen, there appears to be no difference in who secures the nomination. The 
party front-runner who is well known and financed better, relative to his or her 
competition is as successful in a back-loaded contest (1972 and 1984) as they are in the 
frontloaded contests (1988-2004). 
 In both the 2008 Republican and Democratic nomination campaigns, the most 
compressed and expensive ever recorded, those previously important indicators of front-
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runner strength failed to predict the nominee. In 2008 and more recently in the 2012 
Republican contest, the front-runner was defeated in the all-important Iowa caucuses. 
Despite the presence of strong candidates with identifiable advantages in national 
preference and financial resources, the beginning of the compressed nomination race is 
becoming less predictable. 
Table 1.3 
Front-Runner Strength in Iowa 
 
 National Front-runner Iowa Winner 
2008 Republican Rudolph Giuliani Mike Huckabee 
National Gallup  1st (27%) 3rd (16%) 
 Total Fundraising $80,000,000 $9,544,003 
Iowa Finish 6th (3.44%) 1st (34.36%) 
2008 Democratic Hillary Clinton Barack Obama 
National Gallup 1st (45 %) 2nd (27%) 
Total Fundraising $166,007,122 $129,101,004 
Iowa Finish 3rd (29.4%) 1st (37.6%) 
2012 Republican Mitt Romney Rick Santorum 
National Gallup 1st  (29%) 3rd (16%) 
Total Fundraising $38,935,469 $916,905 
Iowa Finish 2nd (24.53%) 1st (24.56%) 
 
 *Fundraising totals are as reported to the Federal Elections Commission as of Q4 the 
year previous (2011 and 2007). Polling numbers are from the last national Gallup tracker 
preceding the Iowa caucuses (1/6/12 and12/13/07). 
  
 While frontloading by the states has been an ongoing phenomenon since the 1988 
nomination campaign, there has been a substantial increase in the amount of money 
involved in the process in more recent cycles. The taxpayer-funded presidential campaign 
fund that was established in 1971 allowed candidates who had cleared a minimum 
threshold in fundraising to accept a matching amount from the federal government 
(Federal Elections Commission 1971). Since then Texas Governor George W. Bush 
decided to opt out of public funding in pursuit of the 2000 Republican nomination, the 
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amount of money that candidates have raised independently has increased exponentially 
and serious contenders from both parties have “opted out” of public financing with 
regularity, rather than be constrained by the spending limits imposed with the acceptance 
of matching funds.  
 The ability for candidates to identify and reach a broad cross-section of interested 
partisans and activists through the internet has made it possible to raise prodigious sums 
of money without dedicating large tracts of the candidates public schedule in that pursuit 
(Trippi 2005; Teachout and Stetter et al. 2008). Concurrently, the Supreme Court9 has 
removed or invalidated previous statutes limiting the financial contributions that 
individuals, organizations and corporations can make on behalf of campaigns, and 
appropriate for electioneering purposes.  
Figure 1.3 
Winning Nomination Candidate Receipts 1980-2012 
 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission (2010)	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 The cost of campaigning for the nomination has reached unprecedented levels. 
Successful candidates ability to raise sums of money that dwarf previous election cycles 
is clearly evident (see Figure 1.3). Successful candidates are able to utilize the invisible 
primary period to build an increasingly daunting financial war chest. The inclusion of 
Super PACs to the money race can accentuate this financial boom as well. Consider that 
Mitt Romney, the Republican front-runner and eventual 2012 nominee, had fewer total 
campaign receipts than Democratic nominee Barack Obama had in 2008. In the 
deregulated campaign finance environment that came into existence just prior to the 2012 
campaign, a Super PAC known as Restore Our Future Inc. whose principal purpose was 
the election of Governor Romney to the White House raised a sum of $23,622,109.6310 
prior to the campaign, to spend for that purpose. When considering the sums from the 
campaign and various Super PACs in totality, there is a clear and profound trend towards 
nominees and now their allies being very successful in establishing fundraising receipts 
that continue to exceed previous nomination cycles.  
 The rapid increase in receipts and expenditures forces a reexamination as to the 
nature of electoral competition within this dynamic. Candidates seeking to capitalize on 
early state momentum predicated on sequential voting, the demonstration of viability to 
future voters and to potential donors, face serious challenges moving forward. The 
amount of money needed to effectively wage a campaign for the nomination of either of 
America’s political parties has grown to unprecedented levels, and requires foresight and 
determined behavior from candidates months and sometimes years before any election 
takes place. States are pressing their way to the front of the nomination calendar, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 FEC Form 3x Report of Receipts and Disbursements For Other Than an Authorized Committee: Restore 
Our Future Inc. 1/31/2012 
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accelerating the conclusion of the campaign for the nomination. There is less time for 
candidates to take advantage of the positive press coverage and demonstrated viability 
that comes from early success. Potential voters in later states can be left out of the 
process entirely, while voters in some states can see statewide campaigns that last 
scarcely a few days as candidates rush into and out of states for multiple elections 
compressed into a few short weeks. Due in no small part to the proliferation of active 
coordination online and the use of the internet in fundraising, immense opportunities now 
exist for nationally well-known candidates, like the party front-runner to amass a network 
of interested donors (Baum and Groeling 2008). Post Iowa and New Hampshire, the 
better-known and better-financed candidates are not as bound to geography as their 
counterparts.   
 While these developments seem detrimental to a competitive nomination 
campaign, that has not necessarily been the case. During the invisible primary period the 
active campaigning that does take place, occurs largely in the early states of Iowa and 
New Hampshire. Structurally the campaign still allows the institutionalized first in the 
nation states to afford lesser-known challengers an opportunity to lay the groundwork for 
a momentum-based strategy. Front-runners as defined by their success during the 
invisible primary period have previously been successful in capturing the nomination. 
The 2008 primary season occurred in the most compressed timeframe of any race for the 
nomination before or since, and despite the advantageous conditions offered by this, both 
front-runners were ultimately unsuccessful. This presents an intriguing puzzle, as we 
must decide if the structure of the competition is determinative or rather if there are 
contextual elements unique to those races that proved the difference. Does our 
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understanding of concepts such as momentum, participation and learning through 
sequence still serve to explain the conduct and results of contemporary presidential 
nomination contests? Or rather do we need to update how these relate to the very 
different political environment that we have entered? The extent to which compression is 
impacting our understanding of the current presidential nominating system is the focus of 
this dissertation and, as such, it is important to more closely examine the impact of these 
seemingly important changes on the system on key actors within it.  
 Whatever the goal of the reformers to the system might be at any given time, the 
ultimate objective of a nomination campaign is selecting the nominee to represent the 
party in the general election. The system as currently constructed still serves that purpose, 
no matter its peculiarities. This dissertation does not seek to add a normative critique of 
the system used to nominate presidential candidates nor the compression of the 
nomination campaign. It is intended to illuminate the impact of compression on the 
system’s key actors.  
 There are undeniably important implications associated with the conduct and 
structure of the process used to select a nominee. It is a concern with the fairness of 
process that has motivated every major reform to the system (Ceaser 1979; Kernell 2015; 
LeDuc 2001).  Voter participation in terms of ideology, partisanship and even geography 
can have am impact on the type of candidates that are produced. The equity in this system 
is questionable, as place in the sequence determines the interest that campaigns place in a 
state. The primacy of the invisible primary, while seemingly innocuous and uniform to all 
candidates, can reward behaviors that are easier for those unburdened by the constraints 
of holding elected office. Position taking, fundraising, and retail politicking in Iowa and 
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New Hampshire are activities more conducive to the schedule of a politician who does 
not have to respond to their existing constituency.  
 As the impact of compression is both diverse and far-reaching, I attempt to isolate 
its effects on the actors who are most instrumental in creating this current structure and 
the most important to choosing the nominee. The key participants in this process are the 
candidates themselves who are empowered to begin their campaigns at any point without 
formal rules established by legal statute or from their respective parties. The voters who 
make their decisions in an information environment that can be tumultuous and uneven as 
candidates make strategic decisions as to where and how vehemently to compete in any 
given contest. Finally, perhaps the most influential actors in this process are the states 
themselves. As the order of sequence in the race for the nomination was not established 
by any central authority or for any normative purpose, it is the states t who ultimately 
hold the responsibility for scheduling their contests and whose competition for influence 
drives this compression of the nomination calendar. The extent to which their purposeful 
actions have any tangible benefit is to be explored. 
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CHAPTER II  
 
 
COMPRESSION AND THE STATES 
 
 
 In this chapter I determine if a state can receive more attention from 
candidates by moving their contest forward in the nomination calendar. 
Compression is a byproduct of states clustering early in the nomination calendar. A 
state’s contest is moved toward the front of the nomination calendar as a result of 
purposeful action. In isolation, it would not seem logical for states to collectively move 
their contests earlier, and compete with one another for the attention of the campaigns. 
Yet the compression of the nomination campaign is a demonstrably real phenomenon. 
There is a general perception amongst the states that earlier is preferable to later, despite 
the competition. This perception might well be true, but it might also depend on the type 
of state in question. 
 Rules governing the timing of participation by individual states in the nomination 
campaign are set out in national party rules and state laws. Each party sets the earliest 
possible date a state might hold its contest and gives a window of time to hold all contests 
before the delegates need to appear at the national nominating convention that summer. 
The Democrats11 and Republicans12 have recently institutionalized privileged states to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 No meetings, caucuses, conventions or primaries which constitute the first determining stage in the 
presidential nomination process (the date of the primary in primary states, and the date of the first tier 
caucus in caucus states) may be held prior to the first Tuesday in March or after the second Tuesday in June 
in the calendar year of the national convention. Provided, however, that the Iowa precinct caucuses may be 
held no earlier than 29 days before the first Tuesday in March; that the New Hampshire primary may be 
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front of that window to prevent states from attempting to challenge their primacy and 
invoke a response that might push those contests even earlier in the calendar13. States are 
thus bound only by their internal political and legislative considerations, and the 
stipulation that they are not permitted to the very front of the nomination calendar when 
setting the date for their contest.  
 Beyond their position on the nomination calendar there are many differences 
between statewide contests for a party’s presidential nomination. The method for 
allocating delegates, it’s partisan composition, its regional location, and the context of the 
campaign itself ensure that some states are bound to be more impactful than others in 
deciding the nominee of any given campaign cycle. The demonstration of candidate 
strengths also remains an important feature of the system. Independent of these variations, 
the size of a state’s delegation will provide it with a measure of importance in selecting a 
nominee, as the nomination is still officially awarded based on the affirmation of 
delegates at the party convention. States with more convention delegates at stake will 
always be more prized than their peers in a competitive nomination campaign.  
 A state’s influence on the nomination campaign depends principally on two 
factors. The first is the size of the states delegation to the party convention, which is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
held no earlier than 21 days before the first Tuesday in March; that the Nevada first-tier caucuses may be 
held no earlier than 10 days before the first Tuesday in March; and that the South Carolina primary may be 
held no earlier than 3 days before the first Tuesday in March. In no instance may a state which scheduled 
delegate selection procedures on or between the first Tuesday in March and the second Tuesday in June 
1984 move out of compliance with the provisions of this rule. (DNC Delegate Selection Rule 11(A)) 
12 No primary, caucus, convention, or other process to elect, select, allocate, or bind delegates to the 
national convention shall occur prior to March 1 or after the second Saturday in June in the year in which a 
national convention is held. Except Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Nevada may conduct their 
processes no earlier than one month before the next earliest state in the year in which a national convention 
is held and shall not be subject to the provisions of paragraph 
(c)(2) of this rule (RNC Rule 16(c)(1)). 13	  New Hampshire law states that the Secretary of State can change the date to ensure that the New 
Hampshire primary will take place at least seven days before any "similar election" in any other state(RSA 
653:9 New Hampshire book of Statutes).  
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determined most predominately14 by the size of the state’s population. The second is the 
place in sequence that the state’s contest is held. Party rules and state-level political 
decisions are responsible for the sequence of primaries and caucuses in the post 
McGovern-Fraser era (McCann et al. 1986; Mayer 2000: Kamarck 2009). States that are 
scheduled at or near the front of the nomination calendar have had an outsized impact on 
the race. In every nomination campaign cycle since 1972, and increasingly since 1988 a 
number of states seeking a greater national impact have changed the dates of their 
contests to move them earlier in the calendar (Greer 1988; Norrander 1996; Mayer 2004). 
One important reason for this is that the staggered nomination race has evolved in the 
post McGovern-Fraser era in a way that nominations are now routinely secured prior to 
the nominating convention and before all states have weighed in with a preference. With 
transparent rules of delegate allocation and very few at large delegates available at either 
party convention the results of statewide contests are decisive in choosing a party’s 
nominee. In the vast majority of contemporary nomination campaigns in both parties, the 
last candidate has conceded the race to the leader in pledged delegates shortly after Super 
Tuesday and long before the summer’s convention. States holding contests later in the 
nomination calendar, are faced with the prospect of holding their contests without any 
meaningful competition, leaving them with no real say on the party’s nominee.   
 The uncertain environment in which states operate provides an incentive for 
holding a contest early in the presence of an active campaign and a clear penalty of no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  While there are differences between conventions and there are differences between parties the example 
of the current Republican convention formula can be constructive. Each state received a blanket 10 
delegates to the convention and 3 delegates for the state chair, national committeeman and national 
committeewoman. Further delegates are awarded for the size of the states delegation in the House of 
Representatives multiplied by three, with bonus delegates awarded if the states electoral votes went to the 
Republican candidate in the last election, elected a Republican governor, controlled one or both state 
legislative chambers and had one or two Republican senators.  
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campaign activity in the state, if a state’s contest is held in the mop-up portion of the 
nomination campaign. The wide leeway states have in scheduling their contests places 
responsibility for the compression of the nomination calendar on their behavior, which is 
based in part on the perception that holding a contest in the early portion of the 
nomination calendar is more beneficial to a state. This preposition is deserving of greater 
scrutiny as more and more states of varying size have moved their way forward in the 
calendar as the reform era has matured.   
 The risk of a small state moving forward into the crowded early portion of the 
calendar is greater than for larger states.  Small states that seek to influence the process 
face the same problem as any state in that they must schedule their contest during the 
competitive portion of the campaign in order to have any influence. Where small states 
face a greater challenge is their risk of being bypassed or ignored if they are in 
competition with a larger state for the attention of candidates. When scheduling their 
contest with a relatively low amount of delegates to be won, these smaller states run the 
risk of being ignored by strategic candidates if a more delegate rich contest draws their 
attention elsewhere in the days preceding it. Though more perilous for state’s with small 
delegations the search for influence has bedeviled states not named Iowa and New 
Hampshire in the post-reform era. 
 One of the few established consistencies in setting a date for its contest found 
within the rules of both parties, that states are obliged to respect is the first in the nation 
position owned by the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary. Iowa and New 
Hampshire receive disproportionate attention from candidates and the media during the 
invisible primary period (Aldrich 1980; Robinson and Sheehan 1983; Winnebrenner 
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1998; Wattier 2005; Donovan 2009). The frontloading phenomenon that at least in part 
causes compression to the nomination calendar centers on the notion that the early states 
are often decisive and thus more important to the candidates and the media who cover the 
race. As suggested earlier this belief has been reinforced by a preponderance of contests 
not remaining competitive into the later stages. It is the environment that states exist 
within, which promotes the idea of frontloading as a way to maximize the utility of their 
contests. History has shown that states have often sought to better position themselves in 
the national political environment. 
 President Carter seeking to bolster his chances at securing a contested nomination 
from the liberal wing of his party in 1980 leaned on Florida to keep its pivotal15 primary 
in March and to persuade bordering Alabama and Georgia to join her on that date 
(Kamarack 2005). This strategic collusion between the Carter administration and those 
politically similar southern states was seen as a way to counter balance the important roll 
played by New Hampshire, a northeastern state thought to possibly give Senator Edward 
Kennedy of neighboring Massachusetts an important early advantage in the Spring of 
1980. The Carter campaign’s calculation that their Southern “firewall” could hold off the 
Kennedy insurgency set in motion the potential for other states to follow the lead of 
Florida, Alabama and Georgia to further their own strategic objectives.  
 A similar calculation was made by Strom Thurmond and his political protégé Lee 
Atwater both of whom were enthusiastic supporters of Ronald Reagan and in 1979 
successfully lobbied the South Carolina Republican Party at its state convention to move 
its contest ahead of all primaries except for New Hampshire (Black and Black 1992). The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Carter had defeated fellow southern governor George C. Wallace of Alabama in that state’s 1976 contest 
leaving him as the only Southerner left standing and helping to clear the way to his nomination (Stanley 
and Hadley 1987) 
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establishment of what would become institutionalized, as the “first in the south primary” 
was a calculated and transparent decision by conservative politicians in that state to 
manipulate the sequence of events in order to help politically conservative Ronald 
Reagan defeat more moderate challengers John Connelly and George Bush in the 1980 
Republican nomination campaign.  
 Beginning with the 1988 nomination campaign cycle, many southern states 
sought to maximize their influence by clustering their primaries and caucuses on a single 
day in March that came to be known as “Super Tuesday.” After a series of defeats to its 
candidates in the general election culminating in Ronald Reagan’s 49 state landslide 
victory over Walter Mondale, Democratic party leaders in Florida advanced the notion 
that southern states16 should consolidate their primaries on a single date the earliest party 
rules would allow in order to advance a “native southerner” or “more conservative 
Democrat” (Cook 1987). This effort proved ultimately unsuccessful. Instead of providing 
the intended boost to moderate Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee, liberal activist 
Reverend Jesse Jackson won half of the Southern Primaries and Governor Michael 
Dukakis of Massachusetts won the three most delegate rich contests that day17.  The 
intentions of the southern states were not secretive. Other states and would-be-candidates 
acted to make the calendar work to their advantage as well. Strategically, non-Southern 
candidates who planned to run in 1988 pressured their states to move their contests on to 
that Super Tuesday date in order to lessen the impact of the Southern Bloc. Instead of 
having a day to itself, the southern states helped usher in an almost defacto national 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, Tennessee, 
Texas and Virginia all held a presidential primary on March 8, 1988 
17 Texas, Florida and Massachusetts	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primary day, forcing candidates to campaign not simply in the South but nationally, 
wherever they saw the potential to do the most good for their campaign.  
 An important legacy of Super Tuesday is that it ushered in the rush of states 
forward towards the beginning of the nomination campaign. Early movement by states in 
the 1980’s was relatively small in scale and done to favor well-positioned candidates. 
This changed after the 1988 effort by Democrats to find a more palatable alternative for 
conservative white southerners proved unsuccessful. Subsequent efforts by states to seek 
an advantage have been largely independent of greater regional or ideological 
considerations (McKee and Hayes 2009). Though from 1988-2008, states from all over 
the country have moved their contests forward in greater numbers each nomination cycle 
in an attempt to be influential in choosing the nominees. 
 While the preposition is logical given the rarity of a race remaining competitive 
up to the nominating convention, it is most certainly one that deserves greater scrutiny in 
that states cannot achieve the coveted position at the front of the calendar that have been 
established by Iowa and New Hampshire. Is there an observable benefit for a state to 
move its contest earlier if it cannot move to the very front? Is that benefit universal or are 
there in fact circumstances in which a state can be hindered by moving its contest 
forward in the nomination calendar? 
 I hypothesize that there is a demonstrable benefit in the attention received from 
the candidates, to the states that move their contests forward in the nomination calendar. 
Though there are states with small delegations to the national convention or who hold 
lightly attended party run caucuses that can be harmed moving their contest forward into 
a congested date on the calendar. With few exceptions the structure of completion is 
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shaped by the sequence of the states. Attempts to bypass contests falling in sequence in 
favor of more favorable ideological or geographical turf have spelled doom for even 
well-financed campaigns such those of Morris Udall, Howard Dean and Rudolph Giuliani, 
as the media declare winners in states no matter the structure of competition (Trippi 
2005). Candidates are obliged to compete in upcoming statewide contests in the order in 
which they appear, if they wish to stay in the race and compete for the nomination. The 
lack of diverse strategies for winning the nomination is a benefit to states as they pursue 
earlier dates for their contests. 
Data and Methods 
 To test this notion, it is important to conceptualize what it means for a state to be 
“influential” in the process. The base assumption is that states want to weigh in on 
choosing the nominee and that nominees are reciprocal in that they want to court 
potential supporters within those states. States move their contests forward to ensure that 
their voters are afforded the opportunity in choosing between two or more candidates for 
the nomination. This is only done during the competitive phase of the nomination 
campaign during an active campaign for a party’s presidential nomination. An active 
campaign is one in which multiple candidates are not merely on the ballot, but still 
seeking the nomination through campaign activities. It is voters in the states having a 
choice between candidates, and thus impacting the national discourse that is the desired 
outcome of states. Such a measure is not binary, in that there is an intensity to a campaign 
that is more desirable still. Besides just having eligible candidates on the ballot a state 
would ideally prefer that candidates make some effort to sway support within that state 
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by paying attention to its voters and their concerns. States are engaged in an attention 
seeking behavior, trying to attract the candidates to their contests.  
 Measuring the intensity of the campaign within a statewide contest can be a 
complicated undertaking. The time a candidate spends on the ground in the state, the 
importance placed on the state by the national media, the money spent there on 
advertising, the number of campaign surrogates, local endorsements and the number of 
volunteers or paid staffers, would all be useful to know when attempting to measure this. 
Unfortunately, when looking at nomination campaigns this information is not always 
available for all candidates over the course of the post-reform era. In order to gain a full 
picture of how intensely a state is contested and thus its importance to nomination 
campaign, it is necessary to devise a measure that can be applied equally to each cycle 
that envelopes as many of the aforementioned measures as is possible.  
 In accordance with federal law, candidates are obliged to report to the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) on the location of their spending over the course of a 
campaign. There is available data from the first reform era nomination campaign of 1972 
all the way through the 2008 campaign showing where candidates campaign 
disbursements have been allocated. Utilizing this information I have compiled a unique 
dataset of state nomination contests from 1972 through 2008 in which to examine the 
affect that compression has on the allocation of candidate disbursements in the states.  
 I theorize that candidate disbursements envelop many of the more perfect 
measures of campaign intensity that are unfortunately not available. While no 
conversation of presidential nomination politics can take place without consideration of 
the important part that the media plays in the dynamics of the campaign, I base this 
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analysis on the assumption that the attention from the media is reflective of the resources 
put into a race by the candidates and their campaigns. There is no theoretical reason why 
press attention to a contest would be more intense than that paid to it by actual office 
seekers. The inverse should be true as well. If the candidates are placing importance on 
the results of a contest to the extent they are allocating scarce resources, then that would 
be an event that warranted the attention of the political press. Moreover Robinson and 
Sheehan’s (1983) intensive study of press coverage of the 1980 nomination contests 
demonstrated a high correlation between press coverage and candidate spending. The 
media will follow candidates wherever they might go, so one should not expect for the 
media to pay lesser or greater attention to a contest than the candidates themselves. Staff, 
volunteers and surrogates must all be paid for by the campaign and should be reflected on 
a disbursement report, just as advertising will similarly be accounted for. A candidate’s 
spending is a reflection of their priorities just as sure as their physical presence in the 
state is.  
 As there have been important changes to campaign finance law, technological 
innovations and inflation between 1972 and 2008, I use the collective disbursements of 
all candidates in a state as a percentage of the total spent by all candidates in all states as 
the dependent variable. This measure is equally valid across each nomination campaign 
and in each statewide contest, and the best possible way to utilize existing data to 
measure the attention that is paid by candidates to various states. If a multitude of 
candidates are competing in a statewide contest early in a nomination contest and 
spending their respective resources there, that state is receiving a greater amount of 
“attention” in the form of candidate disbursements than if it were receiving fewer 
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disbursements from only say two candidates as it might be later in the race, or if it attracts 
only a regional challenger to the front-runner, or is for whatever reason not given serious 
consideration by any campaign. This also allows for the capture of attention paid to a 
state that might not see a competitive contest by capturing all disbursements in the state 
from the inception of the candidate’s committee until the day of the nominating 
convention. Thus if a state receives attention at any point from candidates who anticipate 
its importance, it will be captured here. 
 Due to the presence of outsized and outlying states in the data having the ability 
to skew the results of this analysis I utilize a test for robust regression, to determine if 
movement closer to the Iowa caucuses18 relative to the previous election cycle serves to 
increase the percentage of spending from candidates in that state in that year. The great 
variability that occurs in states between election cycles belies the use of a random effects 
model such as this (Clark and Lizner 2012). The regression equations will derive the 
affect on the amount of money disbursed by the campaigns through their principal 
committees to each of the 50 states holding primaries and caucuses, as well as other 
variables of interest that should serve to further delineate the factors that lead to the 
attention paid by candidates to various statewide contests.  
 The chief independent variable of interest is the change in time measured in days 
relative to the start of delegate selection in that nomination campaign cycle. The 
beginning of delegate selection is represented by the Iowa caucuses, which have been 
institutionalized as the first statewide contest of any type since 1976. For instance, the 
first delegate selection contest of 1980 was held as always in Iowa, on January 21st. That 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	   The first party sanctioned contest in each election cycle between 1972 and 2008 
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same year Rhode Island held its primary on June 3rd. A period of 133 days passed 
between those contests. In 1984 Iowa once again held its first in the nation caucuses this 
time on January 24th and Rhode Island held its primary on March 13th, with a span of 
just 48 days between the contests. This would be recorded in the 1984 data as an 85, as 
the contest moved up 85 days to the start relative to the previous cycle19. This movement 
provides a measurement for compression, as it measures a contests movement forward 
across elections. Measuring simple distance from Iowa in any one year does not account 
for the benefit of movement, only of its positioning. In other words, the reward for 
movement can be measured as opposed to simply affirming the benefit of being near the 
front of a sequential order. I hypothesize that there will be a significant positive 
relationship between compression and the percentage of resources in that cycle disbursed 
within that state. 
 A binary variable is created signifying if a state held its contest alone and had an 
opportunity to attract the undivided attention of the candidates. Another variable is used 
to represent those states from 1988 onward that were part of a Super Tuesday. The 
presumption is that there will be benefit to one of these variables but likely not the other.  
To add further explanatory strength to the model another binary variable to indicate if a 
state borders New Hampshire is included to account for cross state spending in the first in 
the nation primary that was though to be very high for campaigns constrained by FEC 
rules on state spending.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  It should be noted that this measure does not allow for contests prior to 1976 to be included in the 
equations as there can be no compression in the dataset prior to the first contest. In fact much of the 1976 
Democratic contest is also excluded as the rules in 1972 had not yet created but a mere 20 primaries and 
open caucuses. 	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 A variable for the size of each states delegation will be included to test for the 
strength in relationship between delegate-seeking behaviors in the compressed 
environment. The number of delegates actually at stake in any given contest is not always 
clear due to procedural rules such as those for proportional allocation in which states are 
obliged to allocate delegates by congressional district, precinct or some other sub-state 
unit in order to satisfy party rules respecting minority candidates.  
 An additional explanatory variable indicating whether the contest is a primary or a 
caucus is included. Caucuses are traditionally low turnout affairs that require high levels 
of organization to identify and organize potential eligible supporters. Caucuses are easier 
to move up, as they do not require the actions of the state legislature but only the will of 
the state’s political party. Caucuses and primaries differ in terms of the composition of 
the electorate, the type of campaign spending employed (organizational as opposed to 
media), and the amount of emphasis campaigns place upon them (Berman 2012). 
Insurgent campaigns such as Pat Buchanan’s in 1996 or Barack Obama’s in 2008 have 
taken advantage of the higher cost of attendance amongst participants to utilize the 
energy of their supporters to counter the advantages that their front-runner opponents 
derived from their wielding of the party’s establishment base. What has yet to be learned 
is if this difference in the type of nomination contest any meaningful way in the benefits 
derived from compression in terms of attention paid to them.  
 A “native son” variable is included for states that have one or more candidates 
running from that state. States could conceivably benefit allocatively from having a 
native in the White House to say nothing of the prestige offered by being the home to a 
president.  
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 The inclusion of the geographical proximity to the New Hampshire primary in 
part accounts for previous campaign finance restrictions, which limited the amount spent 
per state. No state was more disproportionately influential than New Hampshire in having 
electioneering paid for out of state. Staff headquartered in Vermont, Media buys in 
Boston, Massachusetts and cars rented in Maine and used in New Hampshire were all 
commonly accepted practices for campaigns accepting public financing (Duncan 1991). 
The same could not be said of Iowa where out of disbursements would have hamstrung 
candidates in delegate rich states such as Illinois and Wisconsin (Hull 2007).  
 The state-level unit of analysis allows for comparisons unique to American states 
that are not germane to other delegate selection events20 in which campaign and press 
activity is rarely observed and candidate visits are largely nonexistent.  
 While many of the assumptions of OLS regression are met in these equations 
there is a presence of outlying events that have potential to skew the results and weaken 
the conclusions derived from them (Riani Atkinson and Perrota 2014). States can move 
contests back towards the end of the nomination window for reasons that are not strategic 
but practical or accidental. States have on occasion moved their contest inline with an 
already scheduled statewide primary or to coincide with the other party for cost savings 
or for partisan intrigue. While rare in their occurrence it is important to account for the 
impact these events might have especially if the states are large and delegate rich. 
Additional deviant cases where states move up in front of Iowa and are sanctioned by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The District of Columbia, Virgin Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico and Democrats Abroad all send delegates 
to the nominating convention  
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party central committee and not competitive contests as a result are also problematic21. 
They register highly on compression yet receive scant attention, as candidates are 
reluctant to campaign in those states.  
 The inverse is also true where some states receive prodigious amounts of 
disbursement while having selection contests that are largely irrelevant and not directly 
contributing to the compression phenomenon. This is a relatively recent development that 
has emerged since a greater number of candidates began to regularly refuse to accept 
federal matching funds and freely disburse resources without the constraints of state 
spending limits22. Prior to such a time campaigns had to creatively find ways to allocate 
staff, print campaign materials, expense travel and sometimes even advertise across state 
borders. In 2000 George W. Bush opted out of the public financing system and was able 
to run most of his campaigns logistical and staffing operation from his home state of 
Texas without constraint, as was John Kerry able to do from his Northern Virginia office 
in 2004. In 2008 virtually all of the top-tier candidates in both parties sought to replicate 
this financial path to the nomination. These randomized outlying data points must be 
accounted for. 
 We can see demonstrated that OLS regression of compression on the percentage 
of total spending in a state shows that many cases are either high in leverage or have 
large residuals (Figure 2.1). Note the aforementioned points of Virginia and Texas on the 
far extreme of the x-axis are states where John Kerry in 2004 and George W. Bush in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Louisiana in the 1996 Republican nomination campaign as well as Michigan and Florida in the 2008 
Democratic nomination campaign all saw candidates sign pledges to avoid campaigning there despite their 
names being included on the ballot. 22	  See Appendix for a complete list of candidates who did not accept federal matching funds. 
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2000 allocated large portions of their vast resources for personal, consulting, advertising 
and logistical expenses. 
Figure 2.1 
Leverage and Squared Residuals of Spending on State Compression 
 
 
  
 Robust regression is a useful tool when there is potential for outliers to be present 
within the data that could influence the regression coefficients. Outlying observations are 
subsequently down-weighted in order to diminish their influence and extremely outlying 
observations are weighted at zero removing their influence entirely. Some states that are 
large and delegate rich see more variability in their movement around the nomination 
calendar across recent election cycles reflecting the changing norms of campaign finance. 
They also on the balance have political influence in more areas. For instance these states 
have important members of congressional leadership, produce presidential candidates, are 
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important to the general election strategy of both parties or simply have large delegations 
in the House of Representatives. Small and medium sized states that are not as politically 
influential in other areas such as in the House of Representatives or the Electoral College 
behave more uniformly in seeking to exert influence in this process.  The varying size 
and influence of states within the realm of American politics must be accounted for. A 
least squares regression that is weighted and reweighted does just that. 
Results and Discussion 
 The expectation is for there to be continuous and significant positive results 
across nomination cycles, indicating that there is, in fact, a tangible state-level benefit to 
those who contribute to the compression of the nomination calendar by moving their 
contests earlier. This expectation is affirmed by the results.  Table 2.1 indicates the 
explanatory variables chosen, with the exception of the states holding contests alone on a 
given day were all statistically significant in the predicted direction. Lead by the size of a 
state’s delegation. This should come as no surprise as these states being the nations 
largest and thus having the most voters to reach should take a good deal of resources to 
compete in. 
 These results also serve to illustrate the growing importance of Super Tuesday 
and the primacy of the New Hampshire primary as states associated with those two key 
events see a significantly positive relationship with their share of candidate resources. 
The notion that so-called native sons are instrumental in helping to advance their states 
towards the front of the nomination calendar (or are perhaps the motivation for other 
actors to do so) also gains affirmation from these results. The presence of a native son in 
the race could also require the other candidates to spend more in a state in order to 
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neutralize that advantage. In either or both cases the result offers intriguing theoretical 
possibilities. 
Table 2.1 
Effect of Compression on Total Spending in All Presidential Nomination Contests 
1976-2008 
 
VARIABLES % Total Spending 
  
Compression 0.00256*** 
 (0.000825) 
Native Son 0.310*** 
 (0.0858) 
Super Tuesday 0.229*** 
 (0.0736) 
% Of Delegation 0.510*** 
 (0.0179) 
Solo Contest 0.0578 
 (0.0689) 
New Hampshire Border 0.481*** 
 (0.122) 
Constant -0.238*** 
 (0.0533) 
  
Observations 621 
R-squared 0.615 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 While a 0.00256% gain in candidate disbursement for moving up a day might not 
seem important enough to alter a state’s behavior in a meaningful way, consider that it is 
a percentage of total spending by all candidates. One need only look at the record 
breaking 2008 Democratic nomination campaign where the candidate disbursements 
exceeded $650,113,038.20, to see the potential impact. In that campaign a state moving 
its contest one day closer to Iowa relative to the 2004 Democratic nomination campaign 
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would benefit $1,664,289.38 in candidate disbursements for each advanced day. More 
frightening from the perspective of a state, they could lose out on that amount by failing 
to move up. Being that there is additionally the unknowable spending that comes from 
media attention within a state as well as whatever benefit comes to a state from perhaps 
helping to nominate a candidate in line with their preferences, there is a large and 
demonstrable financial incentive for states to further the compression of the nomination 
calendar all else equal. This tangible benefit can be extrapolated to include the intangible 
benefit of influence as we have seen. 
 Of course all states are not equal and it would be folly to suggest that it is a 
universal truth for a state to move its contest forward independent of circumstances. 
States have those basic party rules that constrain how far forward they can move and as 
the above results indicate the benefit to going alone is far from certain compared to the 
other variables, and of course there is nothing a state can do to alter its geography or 
grow in size. The only variable that states have the unfettered ability to alter is whether 
they chose to hold a primary election or to allow the state party to run a caucus or 
convention system. As these are very different types of events that draw a discernibly 
distinct electorate from the other, it is logical to expect that they will receive a reflective 
difference in attention.  
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 Table 2.2 
Effect of Compression on Total Spending in in Primary or Caucus/Convention 
Contests 1976-2008 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Distinctly different incentive structures emerge between primaries and caucuses 
(Table 2.2). For a caucus to go alone, they receive a lesser share of the overall percentage 
of candidate spending than they would have otherwise. The same problem exists for a 
caucus state if it holds its contest on Super Tuesday. The rules of caucuses are distinct in 
each state and candidates must allocate not just financial resources to those states, but 
technical resources as well. For campaigns that don not posses this highly sought-after 
expertise, the proposition of traveling to an out of the way caucus or ignoring the bigger 
Super Tuesday prizes might not be worth the expense. Even for caucus states though, 
going earlier is helpful in receiving attention from the candidates. A native son candidate 
VARIABLES	   Caucus/Convention	  %	  Total	   Primary	  %	  Total	  	  Compression	   	  0.00150**	   	  0.00359**	  	   (0.000620)	   (0.00140)	  Native	  Son	   0.0159 0.615*** 	   (0.0833) (0.130) Super	  Tuesday	   -0.100 0.350*** 	   (0.0734) (0.112) %	  of	  Delegation	   0.443*** 0.518*** 	   (0.0270) (0.0264) Solo	  Contest	   -0.0606 0.281** 	   (0.0527) (0.130) New	  Hampshire	  Border	   0.729*** 0.160 	   (0.0933) (0.204) Constant	   -0.130** -0.228*** 	   (0.0567) (0.0814) Observations	   183 438 R-­‐Squared	   0.648 0.555 
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is not as demonstrably helpful to a caucus state as he or she is to a state with a primary. 
This might speak to the particular needs of a political organization required to court the 
smaller electorate often seen in a caucus environment being not worth the trouble to 
candidates who must face a native of that state’s political culture. Or it simply may be 
that caucus states do not have the same quantity or quality of candidate seeking office 
from them, as there are fewer of them, and they tend to be in smaller states23. 
 Due in part to their prevalence within the data the results for the primary more 
closely resemble those of the full model and indicate that those contests hold a greater 
sway over the conduct of the nomination campaign generally. Large delegate-rich states, 
states that participate in Super Tuesday, as well as those who hold an exclusive contest on 
a specific date and states that have native son candidates in the race all benefit from 
moving their primary forward in a significant way. When observing these results side by 
side it is a fair conclusion that compression has benefited primary states more than it has 
states that insist upon maintaining a caucus/convention system, save of course Iowa and 
its leadoff precinct caucuses.  
Conclusion 
 The states possessing a good deal of autonomy in the timing and structure of their 
contests benefit in a tangible way from moving them closer to the front of the nomination 
calendar. Candidates disburse a greater percentage of the total contests spending within a 
state that contributes to the compression of the nomination calendar. Absent a more stern 
guiding hand from the party central committee, there is no reason to believe that the 
current trend toward compression will subside. When deciding when to hold a contest, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  The only post McGovern-Fraser nominees from caucus holding states were Walter Mondale in 1984 and 
Robert Dole in 1996. Both were well known nationally the former  a former Vice President and the later the 
Senate Majority Leader at the time of his nomination Both lost decisively in the general election. 
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the incentives for states support scheduling an earlier date. The behavior of other states 
should not deter a state from moving up, as there is benefit to holding a primary on Super 
Tuesday or alone.  
 States operate in an environment of relative uncertainty in which the decisions of 
other states can and do have an impact on what they do. A state might be accustomed to 
holding its contest in the spring, concurrent with a traditional local election day, only to 
find that it has been surpassed by several states and now sits behind many of its peers in 
the sequence. This was the case for Wisconsin in 2000. Their traditionally important 
March primary failed to see a competitive contest on either the Republican or Democratic 
side. In 2004 Wisconsin moved their presidential primary into February away from other 
statewide primary elections, and two full weeks before Super Tuesday, in order to ensure 
that Wisconsin voters would not be left out of presidential selection in that cycle. In 2004 
Wisconsin played a decisive role in helping John Kerry finish off a former top-tier 
Democratic challenger in Howard Dean (Trippi 2005). While Wisconsin acted in 
response to a changing environment in order to have influence over the 2004 nomination 
it had some advantages. It was a state with a sizeable delegation, holding a primary on a 
date that it held exclusively and early enough to see an active campaign from several 
candidates. A state of its size can make a decision to move up, even to Super Tuesday 
and feel confident that it will benefit from that decision even if other states crowd around 
it. 
 States, especially smaller states, would be wise to consider the utility in 
maintaining a caucus system given the shifting structure of the compressed nomination 
campaign. Caucus states already artificially shrink the electorate by not holding a 
	   45	  
statewide election. Candidates appear less likely to place serious resources in to caucus 
states if there are concurrent states where they can also compete. A smaller state that 
holds a caucus is in a different position than Wisconsin was after 2000. They can move 
their contest up in the calendar and see no significant impact. Holding the caucus alone 
nationally does not help and holding the event on Super Tuesday increases the prospect 
of being bypassed for more delegate rich states.  
 The structure of a state’s contest is important to those marginal states with small 
delegations to the national convention. Those states operate at the mercy of what their 
larger, and more politically important peer states do. For every other state these results do 
nothing to dissuade from the notion that sequence is important, and that going earlier is 
better for states seeking attention from the candidates, and the active campaign that 
comes with it. As long as this is the case we should not expect the nomination calendar to 
become less compressed without the intervention of non-state actors like a party central 
committee.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
STRATEGIC CANDIDATE ENTRY 
 
 
 In this portion of the dissertation, I examine how the compressed nomination has 
impacted the entry of candidates into the nomination campaign. I do so utilizing a unique 
dataset covering the invisible primary period from the 1980 through 2008 in competitive 
campaigns for both the Democratic and Republican candidates over that span of time. I 
seek to determine the effect that compression has had on the entry of candidates into 
the nomination campaign.  
 The states who are the driving force behind the compression of the nomination 
calendar have at least the theoretical prospect of being reigned in by the central 
committee and party rules. With no sanctioning body or constitutional limitations on 
campaigning, the candidates themselves are able to begin their campaigns as soon as they 
see it in their best interest to do so.  
 With early success still highly sought after, an increasing expense to running for 
office and the ongoing compression of the nomination calendar, we should expect to see 
an invisible primary period marked by candidates responding to this changing 
environment. Those candidate responses could potentially impact the composition of the 
field and timing of their decisions. In this chapter, I examine the candidate’s entry into 
the nomination race over time, in an attempt to determine if changes in structural factors 
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such as the compressed nomination calendar, have played a role in the timing of when 
individuals make the decision to formally become candidates.  
 The term most commonly used to describe the pre-campaign period in which 
potential candidates try to best position themselves for the upcoming campaign is the 
“invisible primary”. As the name suggests, much of what is done during this period is 
done outside of public view. The deliberations that potential candidates go through are 
not fully knowable until they begin to publicly act in a way resembling how an office 
seeker might behave. While the impact of compression is chiefly important to this 
analysis, it is impossible to look at the behavior of presidential contenders in a 
unidimensional way. Each nomination cycle offers a contextually unique series of 
circumstances that must be taken into account. Through observation of the public 
behavior of candidates for their party’s nomination, analysis of the political environment 
in which decisions are made, as well as the structural factors that shape a party’s 
nomination contest, it will be possible to develop a greater understanding of when the 
decision to formally become a candidate is being made. 
  When a contender for the nomination decides to formally become a presidential 
candidate they are able to fundraise, secure endorsements, garner greater interest from the 
media on their activities and persuade the party faithful as to the value of their candidacy. 
Previous analyses of candidate behavior in nomination campaigns have utilized these 
variables in assessing the duration of a campaign (Adkins and Dowdle 2002; Hinckley 
and Green 2006; Adams and Merril 2008; Damore et al. 2010).  While this work is 
important in assessing the behavior of candidates exiting the nomination contest, there is 
still a fundamental lack of understanding as to the conditions that impact the entry of 
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candidates into the nomination campaign. Theoretically, there is a problem in the study of 
candidate behavior when the subjects are not yet candidates. The “invisibility” of their 
activities makes observation of activity related to a campaign difficult. There is no way of 
knowing if their public behavior is with an eye towards higher office, what their 
intentions are, or even who should be observed. I hypothesize that there are structural and 
environmental factors that play into this decision process that are instrumental to 
candidate entry.  The decision that individual candidates must make as to when to launch 
a campaign for the nomination are in fact contextual to not only the national political 
environment but to the structure of the nomination calendar and the context of the intra-
party competition in which they are to be engaged.  
 There are also candidate-specific qualities that provide different incentives for 
entry into a nomination race. Front-runners have less incentive to become declared 
candidates than challengers attempting to marshal a momentum-based campaign based on 
early state success. Some candidates are serving in offices that demand a good amount of 
their time and energy, as well as their political skill and tact. Others are free from those 
constraints and able to take positions on the issues of the day without concern for the 
consequences of governing.  The different political needs of the individual candidates 
will play an important role in the decision process and are considered carefully in this 
analysis  
 There are difficulties in measuring structural and environmental factors to be sure, 
but the most difficult undertaking in this study is in the data points of the candidates 
themselves. It is first impossible to evaluate who did not run for President and how they 
are different and similar to those that did. Which factors might have led a politician who 
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seemingly had every advantage in place and opportunity to run such as Mario Cuomo in 
1992 or Collin Powell in 2000 to decide against running? Where they aware of some 
lacking strategic element? Similarly what motivates politicians like Lamar Alexander in 
1996 or Chris Dodd in 2008 to leave their senate seat and pursue a long shot presidential 
campaign, when their names are not even included in public opinion polls and they have 
no real base of national support. It would be difficult to call such accomplished men 
irrational, but their actions defy theoretical expectations and provide a challenging 
element to this analysis. 
 Despite these difficulties in measuring and the many inherent unknowables that 
bedevil this analysis, my expectation is that not only are candidates entering the 
nomination race earlier in the contemporary era, but also candidates that do not hold 
office are the predominant drivers of an earlier entry that is occurring. These candidates 
are able to dedicate substantial time to fundraising and are not constrained by a 
constituency in position-taking. This is a consequence of a compressed nomination 
calendar. Additionally, I expect to find that front-runners are not impacted by structural 
factors in the same way that challengers are. They have built-in advantages of name 
recognition and fundraising that allow them to make decisions that are optimal from their 
perspective with less regard for the early actions of their competition. Entry into the race 
and the subsequent electioneering serves to equate them with their fellow challengers, 
expose them to criticism and force position taking on issues as they arise.  
 In this analysis of candidate entry, I look at three factors that are key to when a 
candidate enters the nomination campaign. Chief among these is the structure of the 
nomination campaign that cycle. This is where the compression of the race has 
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heightened the imperative for early success and forced the nomination campaign to a 
more rapid conclusion. Second, is the contextual political environment in which every 
nomination campaign takes place. The other candidates and feelings of voters regarding 
both parties and the incumbent president can shape the narrative and tactics of a 
candidate’s campaign. Third is the quality of the candidates themselves. Front-runners 
and candidates occupying high office face a different electoral reality than candidates 
seeking to introduce themselves to potential supporters. The electorate must know a 
candidate before he or she can make a convincing argument as to their qualities for 
serving in higher office. 
Structure of the Nomination Race 
  Compression has led to a much different pace in the nomination campaign once 
statewide contests begin to be held. It has not, however, altered where the beginning of 
the campaign takes place. The stable presence of Iowa and New Hampshire at the front of 
the nomination calendar has provided a level of predictability for candidates and their 
campaigns. Organizational resources can be best utilized in these two well-positioned 
states that have survived challenges to their prominence over time. Challenges such as 
those launched by Louisiana in 199624 or Michigan in 200825 have been met with 
sanctions from the national committee to their national convention delegate, pledged 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Louisiana moved it’s party caucuses to February 6, 1996 ahead of Iowa’s February 12th caucuses against 
party rules and after all major candidates had announced and made multiple appearances in Iowa. Iowa 
officials gathered signed pledges from President Bill Clinton, Republican front-runner Bob Dole and his 
chief challenger Steve Forbes to not campaign in that state.	  25	  Michigan challenged the right of New Hampshire to hold its traditional first in the nation primary in 
2007 by scheduling their contest for January 15, 2008 ahead of New Hampshire. New Hampshire 
responded by moving their contest to January 8th in response. The Republican National Committee 
responded by stripping Michigan of 50% of its delegates to the Republican Nation Convention. The 
Democratic National Committee stripped Michigan of all delegates to the 2008 convention and thanks to an 
obscure provision under Michigan law most major candidates for the Democratic nomination successfully 
had their names removed from the ballot. 
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campaign boycotts from the candidates and even the demanded removal of candidates 
from the ballot.  Even if the sequential nature of the contest thereafter has been 
accelerated, candidates can be all but certain from these past experiences that Iowa and 
New Hampshire will be the first to record their preferences.  
 Though much has changed, candidates who wish to mount a successful campaign 
for their party’s nomination in a compressed calendar are not unlike their forbearers in 
the back-loaded contests of the 1970’s and 80’s in where they will start out. The 
underlying conditions under which candidates make their decisions will include the 
compressed calendar and the need to quickly mount a nationwide effort after those 
entrenched early states.  As previously noted, the expense of running for the nomination 
has gone up exponentially and the available time to fundraise off of early success has 
been severely constrained by the forward movement of states. It is a growing imperative 
that candidates have the infrastructure of a winning campaign in place, as there is far less 
time to build it as they go. 
 The increasing expense of running for president is a non-trivial byproduct of 
having the presidential nomination decided by an electorate instead of a peer-reviewed 
convention-oriented system. Campaigns, especially those that cover multiple states, 
require extensive resources in order to communicate their message to a broad and diverse 
electorate. Seemingly, candidates for the nomination should be well known to begin with 
(as is the case with all front-runners) or begin a campaign very early in order to increase 
their profile and fundraising potential. It is in this regard that compression has potentially 
altered the decision of would be candidates as to when they might begin their campaign 
for the nomination.  
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 The invisible primary period is critical to candidate success given the shorter 
amount of time available for a momentum-based campaign to take hold. Delegate-based 
strategies under which candidates can skip early states and focus their efforts on more 
advantageous political ground have proven unsuccessful for long-shot candidates and 
even front-runners (Trippi 2005).  The compressed calendar created by the state 
legislatures and state parties has crafted an environment of heightened media scrutiny on 
early events and a lack of potential alternate routes towards winning the nomination 
(Meyer 2001; Winnebrenner 1998).  
 Strategic-minded politicians who wish to pursue their party’s nomination are 
unconstrained as to when they can begin their campaign. They are free to go to Iowa and 
New Hampshire for events, meet with donors and activists, and take action on issues that 
they think will be important to their partisan base as early as they think will be fruitful. 
Potential candidates are frequent visitors to these early states, whether they end up 
declaring for the nomination or not (Hull 2007). Knowing where to begin their campaigns, 
the outsized importance of the results generated from those contests and having no 
governing body to constrain or in any way sanction the start of a campaign provides a 
candidate lacking name recognition or otherwise motivated, to begin their campaign 
activities sooner.   
Political Environment 
 While the compressed nomination calendar has been the most visible alteration in 
the system since 1972, there are contextual factors that make each party’s nomination 
race unique to any given cycle. First, and perhaps foremost, is related to the incumbent 
president. There is no political figure in the United States that exerts the level of 
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influence and generates strong feelings both positively and negatively as the incumbent 
president. There is a high correlation of feelings both positive and negative towards the 
president and feelings towards the president’s party (Beck 1991; Lebo and Cassino 2007; 
Nicholson et al. 2003). The presence of an incumbent president defines the fall campaign 
for both parties. For the opposition party, an incumbent president that is unpopular 
affords the opportunity to promptly provide an alternative program of governance. A 
popular incumbent forces the opposition party into the unenviable position of parsing 
differences and providing a tacit level of support for key programs.  
 When a president is leaving office and the party is attempting to hold the White 
House, they are in a position to defend the status quo for governance. They are 
advantaged by the popularity of the President and similarly disadvantaged if he is 
unpopular. Candidates for the nomination who are representing the party in power are 
subject to a different messaging environment than members of the opposition party, and 
face pressure to support the policy decisions of the President. There is also concern that 
presence of the campaign represents a de facto end of the current President’s term 
prematurely accelerating him into a lame duck. Activist support and attention shift to the 
next president and away from pressuring officials into support for the administration’s 
program. There should be a greater reluctance by potential candidates of the party in 
power to begin a campaign that will in some measure damage a President of their party. 
That is to say that there is a political price to be paid with the base for a candidate going 
against or in any way damaging the governing agenda of the President. This was an 
admitted concern for Vice President Gore in planning his bid to succeed President 
Clinton in 2000. The presumptive nominee was by his own admission attempting to 
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“respectfully” distance himself from the current administration and seek an opportune 
date for formally becoming a candidate that would not overshadow the policy objectives 
of the Clinton administration in 1999 (Turque 2000).  
 Once a nomination campaign has begun, there is little use for a potential 
candidate in waiting to join it, once he or she has determined to do so. The presence of 
intra-party competition can be a source of cross-pressure for a candidate to begin their 
campaign. When other candidates begin to actively campaign for the nomination, 
courting activist support in important early states, seeking and acquiring endorsements 
and raising money they gain and advantage over any potential candidate that delays a 
campaign start. This is a problem that should compound itself as more candidates enter 
the race. There are only so many activists in Iowa and New Hampshire to go around, only 
so many endorsements to be had and a finite amount of days to persuade potential 
supporters before the voting begins.  
Candidate Quality 
 In the aforementioned categories the decisions of potential candidates are made in 
relative equality. Nomination candidates in any given cycle share an electoral 
environment and compete under the same rules using the same nomination calendar as 
their competition. In reality, each potential candidate enters into a race for their party’s 
nomination with very different prospects for winning, different political skills, and 
different constraints on their time.  
 The front-runner has less of an incentive to begin the campaign than candidates 
who seek to build a momentum-based campaign. Front-runners benefit from a status quo 
that vaulted them to the top of their party’s list for potential presidents absent any active 
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campaigning on their part. Once they become a candidate, they are subjected to the kinds 
of questions posed by the media and activists that force them to clarify positions on 
issues, they are contrasted with those of fellow candidates who are elevated to their status, 
and potential voters begin to more seriously evaluate their credentials and positions 
against potential alternatives.  
 Would-be-candidates who seek their party’s nomination and trail the front-runner 
in public opinion polls would seem to benefit from beginning their campaign as soon as 
possible. The have to make up a deficit in support that requires them to build up their 
name recognition and increase their fundraising potential. Previous nomination 
campaigns have shown that a candidate who is far behind in the polls and trying to build 
a momentum-based campaign must do so in the early states using a retail politicking 
strategy (Greer 1988; Hull 2007). This is a time-intensive process that requires that 
candidate to spend time on the ground in Iowa and New Hampshire. Starting ahead of 
like-minded candidates with similar objectives and limitations would further incentivize 
potential candidates to begin electioneering activities. 
 The length of the nomination campaign, cost and strategic decision-making 
required to successfully gain a party’s nomination would most certainly qualify as a full-
time job for a candidate. So too would the job of United States Senator, Governor of a 
major state or congressional representative. Managing both an important office in 
government as well as mounting a campaign for the most expensive and highly sought 
after office in American politics is difficult to do well concurrently. For instance, after 
launching his candidacy for the Democratic nomination Barack Obama missed 78.9%26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/11/02/obama.missed.votes/	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of the votes held in the United States Senate from September through the end of 2007. 
Fellow candidates Chris Dodd, Joe Bidden and Hillary Clinton missed 68%, 65% and 
63% of votes respectively. This is before the rigors of the general election campaign that 
offers virtually non-stop campaigning from the nominating convention through election 
night. Some of the votes missed can be on important issues to the party base such as then 
candidate Obama’s abstention from voting on the expansion of State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program, a very popular program with base Democrats in that cycle. Other 
votes might be important to the candidates existing constituency and challenge the 
candidate’s priorities. When a candidate misses 4 out of every 5 votes in the United 
States Senate, he is also missing time on the campaign trail when he returns to 
Washington to vote on those other occasions. Candidates that do not face the cross-
pressures of campaigning and elected office are at an advantage and have the luxury to 
begin their campaign free of this dilemma. 
Data and Methods 
 In order to determine how the structure of the nomination campaign, political 
environment and candidate quality are important to the strategic entry of candidates into 
the race, I have compiled a unique data set to encompass variables representing the 
aforementioned categories. I test the theoretical premise that these are important, utilizing 
a log logistical parametric hazard model for the duration of an eventual presidential 
candidate’s deliberation period. The candidate’s theoretical deliberation period is during 
the invisible primary, which begins the day after the midterm election prior to the 
presidential cycle and ends when there is a declared race for the nomination. The hazard 
term that represents the entry of the candidate into the nomination campaign is the date 
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that they begin fundraising activities, not their formal announcement that has become a 
staged event meant to garner media attention and is not in anyway the beginning of 
formal electioneering activities. The candidate’s filing of with the Federal Election 
Commission of an official Political Action Committee is when they can begin to actually 
accumulate the resources necessary to conduct any other activities and represents a clear 
delineation from the behavior of a prospective candidate to the behavior of a candidate 
for his or her party’s nomination for the presidency.  
  The data omits the 1980 Democratic and 1992 Republican nomination contests in 
which a sitting President was challenged. This is necessary to maintain a standard 
theoretical direction. Candidate entry for a sitting president is much more of an organic 
process than it is for a challenger. The presence of a challenger is motivated by the 
perceived weakness of a sitting president and the disappointment of fellow partisans 
(Fleisher and Bond 1983, Stone 1984, Norrander 1986). This is an irregular event and 
changes the behavior of the incumbent president who does not otherwise engage in an 
intra-party contest. With those omissions there are a total of 72 unique cases representing 
the candidates who competed in the Democratic and Republican contests between 1980 
and 2008. Competition for the nomination is defined as declaring as a candidate, being 
invited to participate in a officially sponsored candidate forum or debate and appearing 
on the ballot in either the New Hampshire primary or the Iowa prescient caucuses. This 
allows the omission of candidates who form exploratory committees, drop out prior to the 
contest and/or fringe candidates such as Lyndon LaRouche27 who run as a spectacle or 
without any realistic chance of party support.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Lyndon LaRouche ran for the Democratic nomination in every cycle between 1976 and 2004 more than 
once while incarcerated. His views are on government are centered on his interpretation of Plato’s Republic 
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 The data compiled is done so for the purposes of directly modeling the time 
dependency exhibited in the invisible primary period by the eventual candidates. I model 
the time preceding the nomination campaign before the event of their entry. In this type 
of event history model the “failure” times of each candidate should rise over time as they 
draw nearer to the initial selection contest. The covariates that I have compiled reflect a 
condition that theoretically provides greater propensity for a candidate failing to remain 
out of the nomination race or more accurately to enter it. Non-parametric event history 
equations are most useful in studies with relatively small samples. In this study, the 72 
candidates provide 8760 days of invisible primary deliberation and thus an empirical test 
as to the probability that a candidate will enter the nomination race at a given point under 
observable conditions in such a large sample is needed. A parametric model is more 
appropriate given the nature of the data to be analyzed and that there is a theoretical 
expectation that the distribution of the hazard rate will be predictably shaped. Candidates 
will tend to enter the nomination race close to one another fairly early in a given cycle 
with exceptions entering the race later rather than earlier. If my hypothesis is affirmed 
and the model correctly specified, candidates are entering the nomination race earlier in a 
more compressed nomination calendar and the distribution of the hazard rate should be 
right-skewed. There should also be more variation in the back-loaded period prior to 
1988 when there was more strategic variation in how candidates pursued the nomination. 
Learning from those missteps has informed contemporary candidates. 
 The principal variable of interest in an event history equation is time. In this 
analysis each date from the midterm election is a separate observation. Once again failure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and his campaign rhetoric invokes conspiracy theories on topics ranging from the British royal family and 
the perpetrators of the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks. 
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is the date in which a candidate files paperwork with the Federal Elections Commission 
creating an official political action committee to begin fundraising. The covariates of 
interest in this application reflect the theoretical categories I have previously specified as 
instrumental to a candidates decision to launch his or her nomination campaign.  
 Beginning with the structure of the nomination race I have created the chief 
variable of interest to reflect the compression of the calendar. As this dissertation 
explores the impact of compression on the nomination of presidential candidates, it is 
essential to properly conceptualize compression from the perspective of a deliberating 
candidate. For this, I choose to represent the compression phenomenon as the percentage 
of delegates to the national convention that are awarded prior to April of the election year. 
As discussed previously there has been a pressing, forward movement by large numbers 
of states as the reform era has matured. Though, as the results of chapter two indicate 
large states with a high percentage of delegates are strategically important to candidates. 
The movement of delegate rich states can have an outsized impact on the strategic 
behavior of candidates and should be reflected in this equation.  
 The variables created for the purpose of reflecting the dynamics contextual to the 
political environment of a given nomination cycle, include to begin with the candidate’s 
position in national tracking polls. Specifically, the polling distance each candidate is 
behind the front-runner on that day. While the invisible primary is short on many 
objective measures for evaluating the strength of a candidacy this does not stop the 
rampant speculation that goes along with the pursuit of the nations highest office from 
media organizations.  Since 1980 the Gallup organization has polled for every 
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nomination very shortly before the midterm election and with increasing frequency 
thereafter.  
 The strength of the incumbent president is measured through their approval rating. 
Presidential approval is tracked weekly by Gallup and reported for that day. I hypothesize 
that an unpopular president will provide an inviting opportunity for candidates to vie to 
replace him and bring about earlier entry. A binary measure is included for the party in 
power, defined as the party holding the White House. The party occupying the presidency 
should constrain candidate entry. That said, not all presidents are popular within their 
own party to the same degree. To measure the president’s intraparty popularity, I 
examine their relationship with their party in Congress. The most refined measure 
available is the level of agreement with their party’s Roll Call votes in the House of 
Representatives for that cycle. The percentage of concurrence between the two should 
reflect the level of influence the President has with the party’s potential pool of 
candidates. A president who is a legislative ally within a party should deter the start of a 
nomination campaign to replace him. A president unpopular with the legislative actors in 
the opposition party will conversely by his presence encourage the commencement of a 
nomination campaign to replace him to begin sooner.  
 The final variable to evaluate the political environment of a given election cycle is 
the size of the field. Candidates can be forced to make decisions based on the presence of 
exogenous events. One of these that can quickly bring about the onset of a campaign is 
the presence of other candidates in the race. When making decisions based on static 
factors, the potential candidate still is in a position to deliberate. Once the first candidate 
declares and commences the nomination campaign, a delay is more costly as there is an 
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effort being made to court needed supporters. I hypothesize that the hazard rate will 
increase rapidly as more candidates get into the race, as it creates an imperative to begin 
competing in earnest for the resources necessary to mount an effective nomination 
campaign.  
 Candidate quality is difficult to conceptualize in a nomination campaign. When 
discussing congressional candidates, incumbency is of paramount importance, term of 
service in the legislature can be critical in strengthening the advantage of incumbency 
and, of course, high fundraising receipts make a candidate more formidable still (Carson 
et al. 2007; Maestas and Rugeley 2008). These notions are not directly analogous to a 
presidential nomination campaign, as there are various levels of incumbency outside of 
the presidency that are difficult to delineate from one another. How would one evaluate 
the incumbency of a governor over that of a Senator or a member of the House of 
Representatives? In the nomination campaigns encompassed within this dataset there has 
been present a business magnate, former Vice President, a Senator and/or a Governor that 
have been out of office for a number of years, mayors of large cities, former cabinet 
officials, civil rights activists and even a popular televangelist. Though the list of 
contenders often demonstrates incredible diversity is impossible to ignore that some 
candidates are superior to their rivals, even if they are categorically similar. Instead of 
attempting to parse the differences of incumbency for the various offices and positions I 
have tried to delineate legitimate contenders for the nomination from those candidates 
who are using the nomination campaign to advance a cause or their career through 
improving their public profile. 
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 There is a type of candidate influential recurring in most every cycle who is either 
the safely entrenched incumbent of a gerrymandered congressional district or often times 
not an elected office holder at all when they begin a run for the nomination. These 
candidates are able use the profile of the nomination campaign to advance their particular 
issues. These men and women are what Norrander (2006) refers to as attention-seeking 
candidates. They usually do not have a realistic chance of winning their party’s 
nomination, but want to participate in the debates and the campaign to advance the cause 
or ideology that they champion. They are not to be excluded from this analysis as they 
have an impact on the nomination campaign, not just philosophically, but quite tangibly 
by collecting support and later votes. To account for their ideological difference, I have 
included a variable that measures their deviation from the mean opinion of the party in 
Congress. This is calculated by rating their public positions where they exist on key 
issues that are germane to that particular election cycle on a 5 pt. scale. 
 The closest that a candidate for the nomination comes to a something of an 
incumbency advantage would be having run previously for their party’s nomination. 
Having put together a field organization, filed delegate slates and competed in a multi-
candidate, intra-party nomination campaign these candidates have presented themselves 
to a national partisan electorate and, as such, have a profile and experience that is 
invaluable. Ronald Reagan, George Bush, Bob Dole, Al Gore and John McCain all 
captured their party’s nomination after a previous unsuccessful attempt. Respecting this 
invaluable institutional memory, I have created a binary measure in this analysis 
indicating a previous run.  
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 Non-office holding candidates are advantaged in being able to dedicate copious 
amounts of time and effort to campaigning in a way that office holders responsive to an 
existing constituency cannot and are identified within the data. I have created a binary 
variable for candidates holding no elected office to identify this lack of constraint.  
 My hypothesis is that there will be a significant positive relationship between the 
variables in all three categories. Being that the only variable that serves to explain the 
compression of the nomination race is the percentage of delegates selected prior to April, 
this variable is of great concern. While there is also great explanatory potential in each of 
the remaining covariates, the candidate quality measures dealing with ideology and 
previous run should demonstrate a significant relationship in inverse directions. More 
ideological candidates will exhibit a greater hazard rate for entry, while a previous run 
should be negatively significant as candidates that have been through the a prior 
nomination campaign have less urgency in introducing themselves to the electorate and 
beginning their campaign. 
Results and Discussion 
 Before discussing the parameter estimates of the full model of candidate duration, 
let us first observe the pattern of candidate entry at a base level. Candidates were more 
prone to early entry in the less compressed nomination seasons of 1980 and 1984 than 
they were from 1988-2008 when compression became a reality for a nomination 
campaign. Looking only at the mean duration until entry shown in Table 3.1 there was a 
propensity amongst the relatively few candidates in the two back-loaded nomination 
cycles to begin their campaigns roughly a month and a half earlier than later candidates in 
a compressed calendar, and with less variation. This neither affirms nor disproves the 
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hypothesis that compression leads to early candidate entry as this table shows that the 
frontloaded contests after 1984 have many more candidates and a wider range of time 
reflected in their decisions. A more refined measure of compression will help to 
illuminate this point.   
 
Table 3.1 
Candidate Entry by Era 
 
ELECTORAL ERA OBSERVATIONS MEAN ENTRY STANDARD DEV 
 
1980-1984 
 
14 
 
86.85 
 
90.98 
1988-2008 58 130.05 100.14 
 
 The hazard rate for the two eras is demonstrated in Figure 3.1 and shows this 
dichotomous pattern. There is an observable difference in the slope that can lead us to 
contend that there was a very systematic period of early candidate entry in those two 
cycles.  
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Figure 3.1 
Comparison of Hazards for Log-Logistical Model of Duration Before Becoming a 
Presidential Candidate from Midterm to Filing with the FEC 
 
 
  The examination of the effect compression has on candidate entry purely as a 
measure of a front-loaded campaign against a back-loaded campaign speaks counter to 
the hypothesis that I have expressed but is absent the contextual factors unique to 
elections and candidates and is merely a blunt measure of compression. Nevertheless, the 
counterintuitive results of early entry being more prevalent when it was less of an 
imperative for candidates provide validation for the use of the covariates previously 
described. The context of the race and the more refined measure of compression 
discussed previously, provide needed clarity to a discussion on candidate entry into the 
nomination race.  
  While the results of the parametric log-logistical hazard equation do not validate 
all of the more ambitious hypothesis that I have expressed for the covariates, they do 
.002
.0
02
4
.0
04
6
.0
06
8
.0
08
1
.0
1
.0
12
0
0
100
100
2
200
3
300
4
400
_t
_t
pre 1988
pre 1988
988-2008
1988-2008
	   66	  
affirm two hypotheses that can provide greater insight into the effect that compression is 
having on the pool of candidates in contemporary nomination campaigns. 
 Observing the parameterized estimates for the coefficients in Table 3.1 it is of 
primary interest that the compression variable is negatively signed. A negatively assigned 
coefficient implies that the expected duration decreases for changes in the value of the 
covariate. The compression covariate parses the differences between all of the 
nomination cycles by measuring the percentage of delegates awarded by April of the 
nomination year. The approximately -2.6 days of a potential candidates time before 
seeking the nomination associated with a 1 unit increase in the percentage of delegates 
awarded earlier in the nomination calendar is in line with my hypothesis, though the 
measure itself does not reach a level of statistical significance.  
 The two covariates that provide the most explanatory value in this equation are 
both reflections of the quality of the candidate. The ideology of the candidate running and 
the lack of constraints that candidate has in terms of holding elected office during his or 
her campaign are both negatively signed and statistically significant. The approval of the 
President, the President’s party, the President’s level of agreement with his party, and the 
polling done on the nomination race have surprisingly not been significantly 
determinative to the entry of candidates into the nomination campaign.  
 The covariate representing candidates who have experienced previous runs does 
not adhere to my hypothesis. It is possible that candidates who have run previously have 
done so for different objectives and non-office seeking candidates who run for the 
nomination in multiple cycles have skewed the results. Democratic candidate and civil 
rights activist Jesse Jackson seems particularly instrumental here as he was very late to 
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declare in both the 1984 and 1988 nomination campaigns. 
  Table 3.2 
Model of Expected Duration Before Becoming a Presidential Candidate 
Parameterized as Log-Logistical  
 
 Estimate 
VARIABLES (S.E.) 
  
% Delegates awarded prior to April -2.678 
 (3.230) 
 
Party’s agreement with the 
President in the House 
 
0.00485 
(0.0369) 
  
Presidential Approval -0.0343 
 (0.0430) 
 
Polling Distance from the Front-
runner 
 
-0.0447 
(0.0342) 
  
Field Size -17.36 
 (1,034) 
 
Holds No Office 
 
-1.484** 
 (0.749) 
 
Previous Run 
 
-0.305 
 (1.423) 
 
Deviation from party mean in the 
House of Representatives 
 
-1.966** 
(0.784) 
  
Party in Power -0.521 
 (1.461) 
 
Constant 
 
28.32 
 (1,034) 
 
Ln_gam 
          
          -0.127 
            (0.115) 
  
Observations 8,681 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 From these results, we see that candidates who do not hold elected office are 
beginning their campaigns for the nomination earlier than those who are constrained with 
the responsibilities of governing. Candidates that deviate significantly from the mean 
ideology of their party in Congress are also at a significantly greater hazard for entering 
into the nomination campaign than their more mainstream counterparts. This might 
indicate that the candidates who are most anxious to begin their campaign are more in 
line with Norrander’s (2006) attention-seekers as opposed to legitimate contenders for the 
nomination. Though there are many candidates who once held high office such as former 
Vice Presidents and Senators that run for their party’s nomination with a legitimate 
opportunity to victory they appear less anxious to enter the race.  
 The extent to which these ideological divergent and/or non-office holding 
candidates for the nomination are instrumental in the behavior of their rivals in terms of 
candidate entry is not known for these results. What does seem normatively troubling is 
that candidates who seek their party’s nomination can enter into the race later than a 
candidate who is campaigning with a message that is more ideological and without 
concern for a present constituency. Knowing that so much of the initial nomination 
campaign happens in the early states, and that these states have a profound impact on the 
composition of the field after them is a potential explanation for why the Iowa caucuses 
have gone so contrary to conventional wisdom in the in 2004 and 2008. The presence of 
early campaigns in those states, even if they are not successful ones, can have an impact 
on the conduct of other candidates as they enter into the race and find the environment 
changed and ideological positions becoming more salient.  
 The lack of definitive evidence that compression leads to a longer campaign on 
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the front end of the nomination campaign, even as the portion that involves electoral 
competition is compacted, is worrisome from the perspective of the voters. If the 
campaign for the nomination were ending sooner but also beginning sooner then one 
could make the argument that voters still have time to process information about the 
candidates and make an informed decision. If, however, the campaign is merely reaching 
a conclusion more rapidly, then one must be concerned that it is doing so before potential 
voters are adequately able to evaluate the candidates. In a subsequent chapter I examine 
this possibility in greater depth. 
 While the empirical results of this chapter are disappointing the normative 
implications for a study of this type of behavior are potentially profound and worthy of 
further pursuit. Can candidates campaign for the nomination and still govern effectively? 
If they decide they cannot, is the candidate pool becoming limited to exclude politicians 
who place an importance on serving their current constituency as opposed to advancing 
their own careers? Is compression placing a greater premium on politics as opposed to 
governing? The results of this analyses has offered far more questions than answers yet 
should begin a very important conversation as to the pressures inherent to the invisible 
primary period and whether or not they are exacerbated by the compression of the 
nomination calendar.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE COMPRESSED CAMPAIGN IN ACTION: A CASE STUDY OF THE 2008 
REPUBLICAN NOMINATION CONTEST AND THE 1984 DEMOCRATIC 
NOMINATION CONTEST 
 
 
The state and candidate behavior described in the previous chapters is evident in 
examination of the key actors who compete for nominations in a compressed era. States 
are conscious of one another, and where they place in the priority of candidates. 
Candidates are aware of the calendar, other candidates, and the political factors present as 
they position to run for their party’s nomination, even if those things are not always 
determinative in their decision-making. Candidates constrained in some way by more 
than a nomination electorate, and more in line with the ideological mainstream of their 
party are less likely to start their campaigns and compete for the nomination earlier in the 
invisible primary. In this chapter I will illustrate the applicability of this theoretical 
framework from the proceeding chapters by comparing behavior in the back-loaded 1984 
Democratic contest, the last before Super Tuesday was a formalized idea, with the most 
compressed contest in history, the 2008 campaign for the Republican nomination.  
The 1984 Democratic nomination campaign that was contested all the way to a 
floor vote at the convention, saw a different environment and decision structure from 
states and candidates than did the compressed 2008 Republican contest. That race, saw
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a multi candidate field quickly winnowed, and a bitterly divided contest come to a quick 
conclusion after Super Tuesday. A Super Tuesday that was loaded with 20 statewide 
contests that included the three largest delegations to the Republican National 
Convention in; California, New York and Texas. 
The principal challenger for the nomination, attempting to use early state 
momentum to topple a better financed and established front-runner is the paradigm in 
each of the two cases. In 1984, a single candidate who surprised in Iowa and won in New 
Hampshire personifies this. In 2008, it required two separate candidates each possessing a 
unique regional and ideological strength with the electorate and fueled by early success in 
states where the other did not compete. 
A back-loaded nomination calendar allows for a campaign that reaches more 
states, those states are able to influence commiserate with factors little related to 
placement on the calendar. The size of the delegation, the unique political or 
demographic groupings housed within the states become important for candidates 
attempting to demonstrate viability and electability. The 1984 Democratic nomination 
contest, offered the opportunity for most every state in the union to have some say in 
choosing the party’s nominee. Iowa and New Hampshire gave long shot candidate Gary 
Hart a chance to be seen and heard by a national electorate. Large and economically 
diverse states that are must wins for Democrats in the general election like Illinois and 
Michigan were fiercely contested, and the African-American vote, which was and is of 
paramount importance to that party proved to be decisive in key Southern states. The 
1984 nomination campaign was a protracted fight from the invisible primary on through 
to the summer convention.  
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From 1984 through 2008 as the nomination contests in both parties compressed, 
the decision dynamics that both states and candidates were engaged in, became 
dramatically different. Delegates were awarded with greater rapidity once voting began, 
causing a conflict between campaign momentum and viability narratives. States were 
increasingly holding statewide contests alongside one another forcing candidates to make 
difficult choices as to where they should allocate resources and when they should enter 
the nomination campaign. When they did enter they found ideological, unelected 
candidates already attempting to set the tone of the campaign. The invisible primary 
seasons shrank by months as Iowa and New Hampshire moved their contests back in 
order to maintain their privileged status in the front of the nomination calendar. This 
movement was in part a result of pressures created by states attempting to become more 
prominent in presidential selection with earlier contests.  
Neither of these parties produced a successful presidential candidate in these 
respective cycles. The singular motivation of both the Democratic and Republican parties 
are to produce candidates who can win. They design rules and processes that they believe 
will serve to achieve this end at the presidential level. Yet national party committee’s do 
not have enough control to fully curtail state movements, outside of setting the basic 
window for when contests can occur. The changes that have occurred are not by design, 
but rather a manifestation of pressures placed upon the system from a dissatisfied 
constituency. When candidates do not satisfy every constituency, or states do not feel 
fully valued within the process then they advocate for self-interested positioning that 
favor them. This happens regardless of the outcome of the election, though electoral 
	   73	  
defeat or party disunity, can certainly accentuate discontent and a desire for change28. 
Two decades of this behavior manifest itself in the stark changes seen between 1984 and 
2008. 
1984 Democratic Nomination Contest 
The Democrats had the nomination season to themselves in 1984, as Republican 
incumbent Ronald Reagan did not face an intra-party challenger. In 1972, 1976 and 1980 
the party had seen competitive contests, and had tweaked the delegate selection rules and 
calendar, reflecting a concern that the process was overly reliant on early success, and not 
on the electability of the candidate (Herrera 1984; Kamarack 2008; Southwell 1989).   
The rules were rewritten to allow a three-month window in which states would be 
allowed to hold contests. It was hoped that this would encourage states to overlap their 
contests on the same pool of Tuesdays and thus prevent a unified bandwagon effect. This 
calendar would allow candidates to press their geographic and ideological advantages 
where they existed (Polsby, Wildvarsky and Hopkins 2007). This intention ultimately 
proved futile, in large part because Iowa and New Hampshire ignored the rules and were 
granted exceptions from the constraints of the three-month window. This fateful schedule 
and the nature of the candidates in the nomination campaign ensured that the early states 
would prove pivotal in anointing the principal challenger to the prohibitive favorite 
former Vice President Walter Mondale.  
The candidates in 1984 represented a relatively diverse ideological and 
geographical subset of the Democratic Party and included many accomplished politicians. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  After the contentious floor fight at the 1980 Democratic National Convention in which Edward 
Kennedy‘s supporters tried to appeal and win over pledged Carter delegate’s reforms were instituted to 
allow a greater number of unpledged delegates or “super delegates” to the have voting delegate privileges. 
These privileges afforded to elected officials accounted for 14% of the delegates at the 1984 DNC. (See, 
Bringing Back the Parties, by David Price, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984)	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Four sitting United States Senators were competing in the race. Of the candidates who 
did not hold office at the start of their campaign, only Reverend Jackson’s policy 
positions tracked more liberal than the party mean in Congress. Former Governor Askew 
and former Vice President Mondale while not constrained by a constituency when they 
began their campaigns were both slightly more conservative than the House of 
Representatives Democratic party mean. The race for the 1984 Democratic nomination 
was seriously contested by candidates that were within the mainstream of the ideology 
held by the party’s elected leaders in Congress.  
This nomination campaign is largely memorable for the insurgent campaign of 
Senator Gary Hart, as it was an object lesson in the importance of early state success that 
would scare many candidates from pursuing strategies that overlooked their importance 
from then on. For a dark horse candidate like Gary Hart the 1984 campaign offered the 
potential to unseat not just a front-runner but also a prohibitive favorite in Walter 
Mondale. The former Vice President and party stalwart who had been running a “rose 
garden” campaign since President Carter’s loss to Ronald Reagan in 1980. Even though 
Vice President Mondale did not have an elected office from which to base his run, he 
remained in the spotlight, a fixture on Sunday morning news programs and a regular on 
the state party Jefferson-Jackson dinner circuit throughout 1982 and 1983 (Doherty 2012). 
Hart although a Senator from Colorado and a veteran political warhorse from 
McGovern’s ill-fated 1972 run for the White House, was not considered a serious threat 
to capture the Democratic Party’s nomination. Not in field that aside from the former 
Vice President also contained the Senator McGovern himself, hero astronaut and Senator 
from Ohio John Glenn, Florida Governor Reubin Askew and Senators Alan Cranston of 
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California and Fritz Hollings of South Carolina. These men all had a higher profile within 
the party, and were from larger more electorally relevant states (Shapiro 2012). To 
further complicate Hart’s path to victory the Democratic Party’s practice of awarding 
delegates to candidates clearing a threshold of 15% in congressional districts gave liberal 
civil rights activist Jesse Jackson incentive to stay in the race for the duration, in order to 
amass delegates and attempt to influence the party platform at the convention (Barker 
1988). 
The invisible primary season was interminably long leading up to the nomination. 
Table 4.1 shows the lengthy time invested by the Democratic candidates prior to any vote 
cast in 1984. Six major candidates began to act in ways that are consistent with active 
candidacies29 more than a year before the first in the nation Iowa caucuses. These six that 
included Hart and Mondale, were soon joined by liberal lions, and nationally known 
Jesse Jackson and George McGovern in what could already be described as a crowded 
field behind Vice President Mondale. With an established front-runner and a calendar set 
up for a protracted contest after the early states, there was little room for multiple 
candidates to obtain momentum after New Hampshire’s results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Registering a Political Action Committee with the Federal Elections Commission 
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TABLE 4.1 
1984 Democratic Candidate Timeline 
Candidate Entry Date Days to Iowa Exit Date 
Days after 
Iowa 
Reubin Askew November 2, 1982 +448 March 1, 1984 +10 
Alan Cranston November 19,1982 +431 February 29, 1984 +9 
Walter Mondale January 3, 1983 +387 N/A N/A 
Gary Hart January10, 1983 +380 N/A N/A 
John Glenn January 13, 1983 +377 March 16, 1984 +25 
Ernest Hollings January 18, 1983 +372 March 1, 1984 +10 
George McGovern September 18,1983 +115 March 14, 1984 +23 
Jesse Jackson November 14, 1983 +71 N/A N/A 
 
Observing again the timeline of the five candidates that did not pursue the 
nomination all the way to convention, there was a hefty amount of time invested prior to 
any statewide contest, and then rapid withdraw after the early states. Considering the 
results of the Iowa caucuses were decisive in favor of Mondale, as conventional wisdom 
would have suggested prior to the event, it should come as no surprise that the herd 
would be culled in the wake of such a strong candidate. Mondale collected a 
commanding 49% of the vote in Iowa, with Hart a distant second at 16%.  
Something that greatly benefited Hart in 1984, and would have benefited another 
candidate, who might have duplicated his early success, was a media hungry for new 
faces, and new stories after a static invisible primary period dominated by the stoic 
Mondale (Jurkowitz 1996; Farnsworth 2010). The nomination calendar allowed time 
between contests sufficient for the narrative of the race to be reassessed prior to the next 
contest. Therefore even though Hart finished a distant second to Mondale in Iowa, he was 
still a more interesting figure to discuss after months of Mondale’s inevitability serving 
as the pervasive backdrop for each story. Who was this Gary Hart who zoomed past more 
seasoned politicians? John Glenn who finished sixth in Iowa with only 4% of the vote 
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was damaged significantly by this development. The media had the time to focus nearly 
exclusively on the little known insurgent candidate who finished second in Iowa and 
went on to win the New Hampshire primary 8 days later, while Glenn finished a distant 
third behind Mondale and Hart.  
Gary Hart’s name recognition as recorded by the National Election Survey 
increased by double digits in three weeks between the Iowa Caucuses and the contests of 
March 13th, the date in which the most delegates were at stake for any one day during 
that cycle (Bartels 1988, 265-275). This must have in part been driven by the media’s 
fixation on Gary Hart. In a study in which the author coded the content of coverage line 
by line over that course of the nomination campaign, Hart saw more than 50% of the 
coverage from United Press International stories over those three weeks (Baker 1989). 
This is incredible considering the relative distance he finished from Mondale in Iowa, and 
the paltry number of delegates he secured by winning the New Hampshire primary 8 days 
later. For Senator Glenn and the other candidates there was no way to recover from this 
turn as the nomination race began to unfold. 
The race for the nomination in this cycle was redefined after the first results from 
Iowa and New Hampshire were known. Despite all of the time and effort expended by all 
of the candidates prior to the early state contests, the narrative of the race began anew 
once Gary Hart demonstrated a measure of viability in those early states. The amount of 
time spent by the candidates in the invisible primary, laying the ground work for their 
multi-state campaign strategy far exceeded the time they spend campaigning in those 
states once the voting had begun. All of these candidates spent resources and made 
personal appearances in New Hampshire and all but Jackson did so in Iowa. They all 
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invested heavily, but only Gary Hart was able to collect on that investment and move 
forward to challenge Mondale for the nomination. The media helped Gary Hart to be 
perceived as the challenger to Mondale after two states had weighed in. As the forces 
skeptical of Mondale in the Democratic Party coalesced around Hart the other candidates 
dropped out of the race despite their impressive credential, years of service, connections 
and fundraising potential. The people of Iowa and New Hampshire had spoken, and their 
message was amplified by the media to set the tone for the remainder of the race. 
Gary Hart was not successful in his effort to secure the nomination. Mondale with 
his deep ties to Civil rights groups and organized labor, was able to absorb the surprising 
challenge from Hart and secure enough delegates to win the nomination in 1984. It took 
hard fought narrow victories in Illinois, Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania in a 
stretch from late March through early April for Mondale to regain his footing as a front-
runner and even then Hart maintained his stiff challenge winning contests in every month 
of the nomination calendar.  
2008 Republican Nomination Contest 
The 2008 Republican nomination contest saw a truncated contest that afforded the 
opportunity for a few states to play pivotal roles in selecting the party’s nominee due to 
their advantageous position on the nomination calendar, or the size of their delegation. 
Iowa propelled conservative evangelical favorite Mike Huckabee into the National 
spotlight, and the New Hampshire primary allowed John McCain to reemerge as his 
party’s front-runner. The first in the south, South Carolina primary was once again 
central in selecting the party’s nominee, and the delegate rich winner take-all Florida 
primary set the stage for a decisive Super Tuesday contest that saw the field winnowed 
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drastically thereafter. By the time it was essentially a two-candidate race between an 
establishment favorite and an ideological insurgent, more than 80% of the delegations to 
the national convention were already awarded30. 
The candidate slate in the 2008 Republican Primary featured top tier candidates 
that were unconstrained by the constituencies attached to an elected office. Former 
Governor Mike Huckabee, former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and former Senator Fred 
Thompson were all several years removed from their former positions. Mitt Romney, 
who began his campaign in the waning days of his term as Governor of Massachusetts, 
was not seeking reelection in that state concurrent to his attempt to secure the nomination. 
Only Senator John McCain of Arizona was currently serving a statewide constituency as 
he campaigned for the 2008 Republican nomination, and this was in a state that had not 
given a Democratic candidate a majority of its votes31 for the presidency since supporting 
Harry Truman over Thomas Dewey in 1948. The candidates seeking the nomination and 
holding office in the House of Representatives had not faced a serious challenge over the 
previous decade. Between 1984 and 2008 running for the party’s nomination and holding 
an elected office with a statewide constituency, became far less fashionable.  
The Democratic and Republican National Committees had both reacted to 
Michigan and Florida’s attempts to challenge New Hampshire’s status as the first in the 
nation primary, by stripping those state’s of delegates to the National Convention. In the 
Democratic contests no delegates were awarded to either state as punishment, and as a 
result most candidates removed themselves from the ballots and refused to campaign in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Based on an AP estimate on February 9, 2008 the same day that Mitt Romney withdrew from the race 
and offered his endorsement to Senator McCain. 
31 Bill Clinton narrowly defeated Bob Dole in Arizona in 1996 though he only secured 46.5% of the 
popular vote.  
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either, partly to satisfy a pledge from the New Hampshire Secretary of State (Berman 
2012).  The Republican National Committee was less heavy-handed than their 
Democratic counterparts and only sanctioned Michigan and Florida half of their delegates, 
and thus those states joined Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina in the 
“early window” of the nomination calendar. All other contests could begin no sooner than 
February 5, 2008. Table 4.2 shows the nomination calendar and the forward movement of 
many statewide contests.  
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TABLE 4.2 
2008 Republican Nomination Calendar 
Month Day State Type Change From 2000 
January 3 Iowa Caucus/Convention N/A 
 5 Wyoming Caucus/Convention +44 
 8 New Hampshire Primary +3 
 15 Michigan Primary +17 
 19 South Carolina Primary +10 
  Nevada Caucus/Convention +108 
 29 Florida Primary +24 
February 1 Maine Caucus/Convention +12 
 5 Alabama Primary +101 
  Alaska Caucus/Convention -33 
  Arizona Primary -4 
  Arkansas Primary +87 
  California Primary +10 
  Colorado Caucus/Convention +13 
  Connecticut Primary +10 
  Delaware Primary -18 
  Georgia Primary +10 
  Illinois Primary +24 
  Massachusetts Primary +10 
  Minnesota Caucus/Convention +10 
  Missouri Primary +10 
  Montana Caucus/Convention +101 
  New Jersey Primary +101 
  New York Primary +10 
  North Dakota Caucus/Convention +3 
  Oklahoma Primary +17 
  Tennessee Primary +17 
  West Virginia Caucus/Convention +73 
 9 Kansas Caucus/Convention +85 
  Louisiana Primary +13 
 12 Maryland  Primary +4 
  Virginia Primary -4 
 19 Washington Primary -11 
  Wisconsin Primary +24 
March 4 Ohio Primary -19 
  Rhode Island Primary -19 
  Texas  Primary -12 
  Vermont Primary -19 
 11 Mississippi Primary -19 
April 22 Pennsylvania Primary -16 
May 6 Indiana Primary -2 
  North Carolina Primary -2 
 20 Kentucky Primary +5 
  Oregon Primary -2 
 27 Idaho Primary -2 
June 3 New Mexico Primary +2 
  South Dakota Primary +2 
July 12 Nebraska Caucus/Convention -33 
September 3 Republican National Convention 
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 There are two unique features that set the 2008 Republican nomination contest 
apart from all others. The first of which was the rapid demise of the front-runner in the 
early states of Iowa and New Hampshire. The other is the severity of the compression of 
the race. This heavily compressed structure plays a part in the demise of the front-runner. 
With 31 statewide contests between January 3, 2008 and February 5, 2008, there was 
little opportunity for a candidate to recover from early stumbles or to mount a rear guard 
action toward his party stalwarts the way Mondale had done in the 1984 Democratic 
contest.  
 No one was immune from the resource crunch faced by candidates hoping to 
compete in the 20 state “Super Duper Tuesday32” races that included the delegate rich 
slates of New York, New Jersey, California and Illinois. The front-runner through most 
of the invisible primary season was former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, who 
had received national notoriety and acclaim for his management of the city in the 
immediate aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. 
He was joined in this less than impressive field by; Senator John McCain of Arizona who 
had finished second in the delegate count to George W. Bush in the 2000 Republican 
contest, former governors Mitt Romney and Mike Huckabee, former Senator and noted 
actor Fred Thompson, as well as the former Libertarian nominee for President in 1988 
and Congressman from Texas Ron Paul, who was revered in many ideological circles for 
his consistent opposition to federal spending and foreign intervention.  
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  A popular term for this particular election cycle, originally coined by a 2007 New York Times Editorial 
that opined on the negative consequences that could be associated with New York and California’s move to 
the front of the nomination calendar.  
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TABLE 4.3 
2008 Republican Candidate Timeline 
Candidate Entry Date Days to Iowa Exit Date 
Days 
after 
Iowa 
John McCain November 16, 2006 +413 N/A +244 
Rudolph Giuliani November 20, 2006 +409 January 30, 2008 +27 
Mitt Romney January 3, 2007 +365 February 7,2008 +35 
Duncan Hunter January 12, 2007 +356 January 19, 2008 +16 
Tom Tancredo January 22, 2007 +346 December 20, 2008 -14 
Mike Huckabee January 29, 2007 +339 March 4, 2008 +61 
Ron Paul March 12, 2007 +296 June 12, 2008 +161 
Fred Thompson September 7, 2007 +125 January 22, 2008 +19 
 
 This field (Table 4.3) while deep in political experience did not contain a 
candidate skilled enough or with deep enough support to manipulate the party apparatus 
the way Carter had in 1980 or Bush did in 2000, to ensure the calendar unfolded in a way 
that was particularly advantageous. Though there were no shortages of candidates that 
were well funded or, strong in a particular geographical area the way that Carter had been, 
and no one possessed a network of surrogates who were strong enough to stem the 
pressing desire by states to advance themselves towards the front of the nomination 
calendar.  In fact states acting on behalf of their native sons were more likely to move 
forward than not irrespective of the context of the race. The desire to support McCain by 
Arizona and Giuliani33by New York were reasons given by legislators and activists when 
discussing reasons for moving those contests to the already crowded Super Tuesday 
slates.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Senator	  Hillary Clinton of New York was the Democratic front-runner and her strategy favored a more 
decisive early Super Tuesday as well (Gutgold and Cocoo 2009).  Though Clinton was elected from New 
York and the Democratic Party controlled the state legislature, state level Republican affirmed their desire 
to hold the contest on Super Tuesday for the perceived benefits to Giuliani’s chances (See Primary 
Problems NY Times Editorial September 2, 2007).  
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 The 2008 Republican nomination calendar did not reflect a desire to accentuate 
the strengths of any one particular candidate. The calendar was rather the manifestation 
of repeated infighting between states looking to have a greater influence on who the 
party’s nominee will be. The pressure felt by state-level actors to ensure their contests 
were relevant to the nomination drove many of them to the earliest start date allowed 
under party rules. 
 As the race began to take shape Rudolph Giuliani pulled his slumping campaign 
out of Iowa where conservative evangelical former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee 
proved very strong and ultimately successful. Giuliani did not demonstrate viability by 
winning in Florida where he had staked his hopes and placed the last of his resources. He 
was forced to exit the nomination race before attempting to compete in the expensive 
defacto national primary held on the most massive and definitive Super Tuesday on 
record. By failing to gain a single delegate despite having out raised every other 
candidate and possessing a lead in the national poll prior to the Iowa caucuses, Giuliani 
did something no other pre primary front-runner had ever done. The compressed calendar 
proved too much for even a skilled and nationally known politician to overcome. 
 The race to establish themselves as the national front-runner fell eventually to 
Mitt Romney and John McCain, with Iowa winner Mike Huckabee seeking delegates in 
more conservative southern states in hopes of a brokered convention. With a close New 
Hampshire victory Senator McCain began to out distance Governor Romney, and using a 
crowded field to win narrow pluralities in South Carolina and Florida he took a national 
lead in the polls and in the delegate count just prior to the massive Super Tuesday slate.  
This was helpful in securing endorsements from the Republican Governor of California 
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Arnold Schwarzenegger and Rudolph Giuliani in the week leading up to the contests in 
California and New York. McCain won those delegate rich states and took 9 of the 20 
contests overall. 
 The showing on “Super Duper Tuesday” was enough for Romney to concede and 
endorse McCain. Huckabee would continue to compete and win contests in the South and 
Ron Paul would press his organizational strength to secure delegates at various party 
caucuses over the next month, though both eventually conceded that the delegate math 
was impossible to overcome and withdrew. On March 4, 2008 after being swept by 
McCain head to head in Texas, Ohio, Rhode Island and Vermont, Huckabee officially 
conceded the race, with 10 states left who had not weighed in on their preference. By 
choosing not to move to the front of a crowded field these states did not have an 
opportunity to help select the Republican nominee that year. 
 In 2008 the Republican contest was all but over by the time two candidates with 
different ideological perspectives were set to square off. By having 31 contests in the first 
month of the nomination calendar, early success was of paramount importance. John 
McCain had enough early success to win his party’s nomination. There could be no ebb 
and flow in a campaign that was this compressed. The fact that McCain was the only 
politician in the race that was still serving as an elected official, responsive to a statewide 
constituency did not impede his victory in this case. In this cycle the calendar 
overwhelmed most every other factor that might be determinative of candidate success. 
McCain’s campaign found its footing at the exact right time and others did not. 
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The Compression Decision 
 2008 was notable for a nomination calendar more compressed than any since the 
party implemented reforms to select a majority of convention delegates through statewide 
contests. Table 4.2 shows this incredible glut of states that voted on February 5, 2008, 
consider that concurrent to this, the Democrats were voting in these states and holding 
caucuses in two others. Taken in isolation it seems dubious that any state would want to 
move away from a system like the one in 1984 that saw relative parity in the wake of the 
privileged states Iowa and New Hampshire and join in this pack of states all competing 
for attention on the same day. This is not the case however and states with a fraction of 
the delegates move alongside larger states early in the nomination calendar. The fear of 
being left out and holding a meaningless contest seems greater than the threat of being 
lost in the shuffle.  
States do not make their decisions in isolation but rather in an uncertain 
environment where they react to the movement of other states, with a desire to be 
influential. “If going early is a benefit to New Hampshire, Iowa, South Carolina and 
Nevada then why not for my state?” When any state answers this question with 
movement forward in the calendar it has the potential to cause a reaction from other 
states. These exogenous pressures towards forward movement can be even more critical 
when they involve a delegate rich state. This was the case in 2008, when the Democratic 
National Committee moved the Nevada party caucuses to the week between the Iowa 
caucuses and the New Hampshire primary. While at the same time, moving South 
Carolina's primary to the week following New Hampshire's and stating that no other state 
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that held a primary before February 5, 2008 would have its delegates seated. This decree 
set off a rush of states targeting that early February date 
Of the contests held on February 5, 2008 California seems like one of the least 
likely to join this rush after failing to pass AB2949 a bill that would have mandated that 
California “require the Secretary of State to select a date that results in California being 
the first state in the United States to hold its presidential primary, as specified" only two 
months prior to the DNC’s ruling. Though unsuccessful this legislation highlighted an 
undercurrent of discontent in California for the lack of relevance the state had in selecting 
the President. Since 1992 California has awarded its electoral votes (the most of any 
state) to the Democratic candidate, and short of fundraising neither major party nominee 
spends much time campaigning in that expensive state, expecting similar results 
(Norrander 2009). 
Concurrent to California solidifying as a Democratic Electoral College stronghold, 
it had also seen its presidential primary shrink from significance, as Super Tuesday 
became more definitive and nomination campaigns began to end earlier. The California 
primary was demonstrably interesting and instrumental even before the reform movement 
democratized the means of presidential selection. The Republican contest was won three 
times34 by future Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court Earl Warren, and its 
first post-reform contest gave native son Ronald Reagan a resounding victory over 
President Gerald Ford in 1976, that sustained him and allowed for that contest to extend 
all the way through to the nominating convention. Prior to the reform era the Democrats 
had given famous author Upton Sinclair 11% in his bid against Franklin Roosevelt in 
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  1936, 1948 and 1952	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1936 and vaulted Robert Kennedy ever so briefly to the top of the Democratic Party prior 
to his assassination at the Ambassador Hotel on the night of his primary victory in 1968 
(Sorenson 1993). In the first post-reform contest of 1972, the June California primary 
was contested by all major candidates and proved definitive to the successful campaign 
of George McGovern. This traditionally late date also saw competitive contests for its 
large delegation in 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1992 from at least two major party candidates. 
It gave life to the challenges of Ronald Reagan, Edward Kennedy and Gary Hart and 
nearly did so for Gerry Brown in 199235, but it was not seeing its choice affirmed as it 
had in 1972.  
As the dynamics of modern presidential selection favor the size of a state’s 
delegation and placement on the nomination calendar, California has an opportunity to 
assert its influence in nomination politics in a way it can not during a general election 
campaign by moving the date of its contest up in the calendar. This is what it did in 1996 
by moving from its traditional June date to a late March primary. It was not enough to 
become impactful on the process, however as Bob Dole had cleared the field by the time 
the primary rolled around on March 26th of that year. The state moved up again in 2000 
to March 7th, and once again in 2004 to March 3rd. The results from California were not 
determinative in any or those years either. On Sept. 27, 2004 Gov. Arnold 
Schwarzenegger signed into law SB1730 which moved the budget strapped state's 
primary back to June.  The legislation introduced by a Republican but receiving 
bipartisan support termed the March primary an "utter failure." During the debate the 
bill’s sponsor noted, "In the 2004 Primary, California set a record for the lowest turnout 	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  In 1992, California was the only state of 7 voting on June 2,1992  that was closely contested between 
Gerry Brown and Bill Clinton. Clinton won the contest with approximately 45% of the vote to Brown’s 
40% 
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ever in a presidential primary election.  In the 2002 Primary, California set a record for 
the lowest turnout ever in a primary election in our state's history.  And California's eight-
month gap between the primary and general election resulted in the lowest turnout ever 
for a general election in November 2002."  
Instead of retreating though California was back to debating an effort to move to 
first in the nation just two years later (California AB2949). Prompted by movements from 
Michigan and Florida to challenge the New Hampshire primary’s first in the nation status, 
the discussion of an earlier date in California was reignited and politicians began to again 
question the rationale behind letting smaller and less economically diverse states have 
such a prominent say in presidential selection while the largest state in the union with the 
largest economy waited on the sidelines. In response to question regarding a possible 
change from the June date to an earlier one at a Sacramento Press Club luncheon in 
January of 2007, Governor Schwarzenegger stated: 
"I've spoken to the leaders about that, and I think that it is just something that we should 
look at, because I'm interested to make California a player (sic).  I mean, right now, think 
about it, we are the number one state in the union, we're the number one place in the 
world, and yet we are kind of an afterthought when it comes to presidential campaigns.  I 
mean, all those guys come out here and they clean up, and they take the money and they 
run; millions and millions and millions of dollars, both parties.  But we have no—we are 
not part of the decision making.  Or that they're even coming here and campaigning here, 
because they just it write if off, because California is not relevant.  So what we want to do 
is, we want to make California relevant.  And I think the way we make it relevant, this 
state, is by moving up the primaries maybe to February.  So this is something we talked 
about, and I think that that is something that we should shoot for." 
 
One day later legislation was introduced to move the California from June to the first 
Tuesday in February, the earliest date allowable under party rules.  
 Concurrent debate was already underway in states such as Minnesota and 
Connecticut, and instead of shrinking from sharing the date with California, and later 
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New York and New Jersey there was instead a greater urgency in moving forward 
(Norrander 2009). Small states that had moved their contests to February 5, were also 
staying put and not moving away from the date. Alabama was one such state where 
discussions began to move from February back to its original date in April after 
California’s move. These plans were quickly abandoned and many supporters of the early 
date doubled down in their support. Alabama Secretary of State Jim Bennett, said the 
growing bloc of primaries has increased the importance to become involved on an early 
date.  
“The fact that everyone is doing it makes it more vital or you will have no voice," said 
Bennett, a past president of the National Association of Secretaries of State. “I think like 
75 percent of all delegates will be selected by March so Alabama can’t wait until June if 
it intends to have any influence in any party." (“Alabama’s Super Duper Dilemma” 
Tuscaloosa News 2 October 2007) 
 
 Secretary Bennett’s sentiment is not unlike that of many state actors seeking to 
influence this dynamic process. States, both large and small, negotiating a chaotic 
environment where guidance from the parties is limited and not often reflective of 
grander designs are left to work within the system as best they can. While some states 
like California feel they should have influence commiserate with their status amongst the 
states, other smaller states like Alabama are seeking to simply draw some attention from 
the candidates and be relevant to the discussion. Both are linked in that they are reacting 
to a lack of structure and out of an impulse to have their voters cast votes before the 
nomination is decided. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CANDIDATE FAMILIARITY IN A COMPRESSED CAMPAIGN 
 
 
  In the proceeding chapters I demonstrated that there is a pronounced compression 
of the nomination campaign once voting commences in the states, it does not appear to 
significantly impact the entry of the candidates and the duration of the invisible primary. 
Candidates by in large are not commencing the visible part of the nomination campaign 
and beginning their campaigns earlier. This is a potentially troubling development from 
the perspective of the voting public. Voters do not have more time prior to the early state 
contests to familiarize themselves with candidates they are being presented, instead they 
are faced with a compressed campaign that evolves rapidly and moves quickly from state 
to state after the first votes are cast. They have a shorter amount of time in which to 
become familiar with these candidates before events bring the nomination campaign to a 
conclusion. In this chapter I seek to use existing data to determine the changes in voter 
familiarity with nomination candidates from the back-loaded 1984 contest and the 
historically compressed 2008 campaign.  
 Before addressing those cases let us first consider the change that has occurred 
since the first post reform campaign through the most compressed campaign. The 
perspective of a voter in California in 1972 when the reform movement was in its infancy 
is instructive for this purpose. The most delegate rich state in the Democratic delegation 
held its contest on June 6th with the party’s convention just over a month away. That 
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voter was able to witness the epic drama of a marathon Democratic nomination campaign 
unfold over nearly half a calendar year. Beginning as always with the Iowa caucuses on 
January the 24th this nomination campaign was historic and dramatic in every respect. 
The tearful defense of his wife by front-runner Edmund Muskie in front of the New 
Hampshire Union Leader occurred on February the 26th, still two weeks before voting 
took place in that state shook up the field and damaged a party front-runner. The first 
statewide victory by eventual nominee George McGovern was not until April the 4th. 
George C. Wallace the champion of the southern reactionary wing of the party, 
Independent candidate in 1968 and winner of the delegate rich Florida primary survived 
an assassination attempt on the 15th of May, and went on to win contests in Maryland 
and Michigan while recovering from his wounds. Former Democratic nominee and Vice 
President Hubert Humphrey did not even enter the race until March of that year, weeks 
after the New Hampshire primary but was a force throughout, winning Illinois and 
Pennsylvania. If you were a voter in California you had 5 moths to observe these events, 
evaluate the men involved, take into account their viability, electability and issue 
positions, and weigh your choices prior to the pivotal winner-take-all contest. Humphrey, 
Wallace, McGovern and Muskie stayed in the race all the way through to the national 
convention, giving those voters an opportunity to not only learn about them but to make a 
selection for their preference of nominee. When Californians handed George McGovern 
the delegates he needed to win the party’s nomination in 1972 whatever the wisdom of 
their choice, there was little concern that they were making the decision between 
unknown entities.  
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 If you were a Democratic voter in California in 2008 your state had even more 
delegates at stake to the national convention than it did in 1972, however they were now 
awarded on a proportional basis, which meant that most candidates who received 
significant votes in the state would be awarded some delegates. Barack Obama’s 2008 
victory in the Iowa caucuses on January 3rd was ground breaking and historic for many 
reasons, but shortly enjoyed as the campaign moved quickly to the first in the nation 
primary less than a week away. As Barack Obama emerged as a legitimate challenger to 
Senator Hillary Clinton the winner of the January 8th New Hampshire Primary the rest of 
the field quickly withdrew from the race. After failing to win the next and only primary 
before Super Tuesday in South Carolina, 2004 Democratic Vice Presidential nominee 
John Edwards withdrew from the race leaving only Senators Obama and Clinton to 
compete in the 46 states yet to weigh in with their preferences. A California voter went to 
the polls on February the 5th, not one moth removed from the New Hampshire primary 
along with voters in 22 other states to choose between two candidates, one of which was 
vaulted into the national consciousness in the very recent past. California saw visits from 
both senators Clinton and Obama leading up to the contest, which is more attention than 
10 other states voting on that day received from them. Campaigning in 23 states in the 10 
days after the South Carolina primary is a massive undertaking, which only the most well 
financed campaigns can hope to pursue righteously. Strategic choices must be made to 
appropriate scarce resources efficiently. California voters are fortunate to live in a state 
that cannot be ignored, and receive the attention that they did from the remaining 
candidates. 
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 The nations largest state had joined with others in moving their contest forward to 
the earliest possible date allowed by party rules. This is a behavior that benefits a large 
state like California. What about the voters though? Did the month they had to observe 
this race, mostly from afar give them enough time to evaluate the candidates? The lack of 
a real campaign in many states, and the lack of time to become familiar with these 
candidates before a vote is required, is a potentially devastating flaw in this current 
iteration of a system for choosing a nominee.  
 Campaigns provide the electorate with information regarding candidates. Alvarez 
(1997, 2001) has demonstrated that voter uncertainty as to the issue positions of 
candidates falls over the course of presidential campaigns. A nomination campaign offers 
voters a much different dynamic in choosing between candidates than does the general 
election campaign. The policy preferences of candidates in an intra-party election are 
typically less divergent than those of competing partisans. Wattier (1983) demonstrates 
that a candidate’s ideology is an important explanatory variable in primary voting. 
Norrander (1986) found that voter preferences in the 1980 Democratic contests 
preference for a candidate were highly correlated with their perceived qualities. This, in 
part, affirmed earlier work by Marshall (1984) showing that candidate traits were 
important determinants in how voters selected their preferred candidate. Sill other works 
have shown that the viability of the candidate in the upcoming general election is 
considered strongly by voters (Abramowitz 1989).  
 Any explanation for voter choice is based on the foundation that the voters 
themselves have some opinion of the candidates they are selecting from regardless of 
their reason for that selection. There is an underlying normative assumption in studying 
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voter behavior that the act of voting is done purposefully (Enelow and Hinich 1984). 
Rational voters will thus not cast a ballot for a candidate that they have not yet heard of.  
Candidates attempting to secure their party’s nomination for the presidency have the 
daunting task of having to “introduce themselves” to the party faithful both nationally 
and more urgently in strategically selected states. I theorize that this has grown more 
difficult for candidates other than front-runners as the nomination contest has become 
further compressed.  
 In order to become a preprimary front-runner for their party’s nomination, a 
candidate must be one of the most highly visible and influential people in American 
politics, whereas other challengers for the nomination can come from all manners of 
obscurity. For candidates attempting to win the nomination without the benefit of 
national notoriety, the task can be prohibited by a scarcity of resources that do not trouble 
the front-runner. A lack of resources and name recognition is mitigated by early success 
and the subsequent momentum generated from it (Abramowitz 1989; Steger 2007).  
 Momentum in the sequential nomination campaign affords those who win 
unexpected victories the ability to take advantage of the media attention generated by 
their success to sway subsequent state voters and potential donors as to the viability of 
their candidacy (Bartels 1985, 1988; Gurrian and Hayes 1993 and Norrander 2000, 2006). 
As demonstrated in the second chapter, states are incentivized to move contests forward, 
and despite candidates responding to various pressure when deciding when to begin 
mounting their campaigns, the compressed environment is not determinative in beginning 
campaigns earlier. With contests occurring earlier, closer to New Hampshire and Iowa 
and in multiple states on the same day there is less time for the much desired media 
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attention afforded to momentum-based candidates to saturate news consumers. Whether 
trying to present themselves to potential voters through campaign activity or media 
outreach, a compressed calendar has accelerated the onset of electoral competition and 
given candidates less time to compete with increasingly well-funded and well-known 
front-runners for attention.  
 While the winnowing of challengers who fail to generate momentum from early 
success is common throughout the post reform era, momentum-based challengers seem to 
be in increased peril from a compressed calendar. Momentum-based candidates are still 
in the process of introducing themselves to the larger electorate after the results of Iowa 
and New Hampshire are recorded. They are the ones who need to build on the attention 
afforded to them by their early success and, in a compressed era, need to raise more 
money to compete in more states with far less time available for such purposes, than 
existed in previous eras. 
 As the sequence of states holding contests has grown more compressed, there is a 
concern that voters are not sufficiently aware of the candidates by the time they get to 
vote. The extent that the shorter time period afforded by compression posses a normative 
threat to the representativeness of the nomination process is contingent upon the voters or 
more accurately the potential voters ability to form some impression of the candidates 
prior to their opportunity for making a decision. 
 The winnowing of the field has the effect of eliminating candidate organizations 
that are engaged in actively mobilizing the electorate. As the field becomes smaller in 
subsequent states there are fewer candidates operating in a larger space. In a compressed 
environment, where there is less time available for potential voters to consume and 
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process information regarding the campaign. This lack of deliberate attention can create 
an information vacuum filled either by the media, or with non-campaign related 
information. In addition the cost associated with informing and mobilizing the electorate 
is far too great for most campaigns to undertake independent of coverage in the press. 
The media is the institution most responsible for informing the potential primary 
electorate as to the presence of the candidates, and the media is most concerned with 
presenting a story that is interesting to their readers or viewers than they are 
disseminating neutral or normatively important information.  
 Momentum-based campaigns are predicated on the use of the national media and 
their coverage of the “horse race” to help introduce the candidate to voters. “Horse race” 
is the term given to coverage of the nomination race as a competitive challenge between 
the candidates, in which one is leading or behind, gaining or losing ground or making a 
move (Mutz 1995). Candidates who exceed the expectations set for them change the 
narrative of the horse race in their favor, and provide the media an opportunity to update 
their coverage in a new and exciting way. Momentum is essential for challengers to 
introduce themselves beyond the early states where they actively campaign.  
 While some campaigns are in interesting for reasons beyond the horse race, on 
balance, very little is known regarding the candidates policy positions prior to the time 
candidates begin to campaign for the nomination (Dowdle, Adkins and Sterger 2009; 
Lenart 1997; Popkin 1991). Campaigns that are ideologically distinct are very rare in 
American presidential nominations and have a much more narrow appeal (Brady et al. 
2007; Mathiowetz 2008). Candidates for their party’s nomination are demonstrably more 
similar to one another on salient policy issues than they are to the candidates from the 
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other party (Brady et a. 2007; Gerber and Morton 1998; Norrander 1989). The media also 
tend to focus less on policy differences amongst candidates and more on the competitive 
aspects of the horse race as the campaign progresses and there is a greater preponderance 
of polling data and electoral results on which to extrapolate (Miller and Andsager 1998; 
Mutz 1995). 
 With the disparity in stature between front-runners and challengers, it is a 
daunting task to build mass partisan support when there are few discernable differences 
to highlight on matters of policy and no informational shortcut in terms of partisanship to 
rely upon. Candidates must distinguish themselves and inform the public of the unique 
qualities they posses that will benefit the party in the general election and qualify them to 
serve as President. In order for this to occur, they need to both engage in an aggressive 
campaign to reach voters directly, and indirectly by way of media coverage. The former 
can occur only after sufficient fundraising or time spent campaigning in states that hold 
early nomination contests. The latter being possible after candidates have demonstrated a 
measure of viability either through impressive polling or electoral results (Abramowitz 
1987; Aldrich 1980; Bartels 1988; Collingwood and Barreto 2012 ; Stone 1983).  
 These limitations on the potential for generating momentum have led to an 
acceleration of the winnowing effect had by early states (Mayer and Busch 2004). While 
front-runners are largely insulated from this effect, failure to generate momentum has 
traditionally proven decisive in eliminating other office-seeking candidates from the 
nomination contest. What is of particular concern is whether or not momentum-based 
candidates can still be successful in a compressed field. Are voters sufficiently aware of 
these momentum-based candidates by the time they have to register a choice? 
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 The central focus of this chapter is if voters are learning about the candidates in 
the race by the time their state begins its contest. A campaign that begins at roughly the 
same point and ends more rapidly has the potential to do so before a significant portion of 
the voting population has been mobilized. While this is concerning it is not necessarily 
something that can be assumed just by the mere presence of a compressed electoral 
calendar. There are, after all, more media alternatives available with the increasing 
dominance of the Internet as a means for the deliverance and acquisition of information 
(Prior 2007). Cable news has also provided political enthusiasts with a steady supply of 
political content and has become particularly instrumental in dispersing overtly partisan 
information (Coe et al. 2008).  If such is the case that the shorter campaign period is 
offset by these technological and media innovations then we should not be at all 
concerned that the decision-making process for potential voters is being accelerated, so 
long as the means for acquiring information necessary for making that decision is 
concurrently being provided at an accelerated rate and that there is no group that is 
systematically unable or unwilling to participate in this political environment.  
 It is possible that candidates are winnowed before being brought in front of a 
significant portion of the American electorate. Even if voters have an opportunity to 
become familiar with candidates due to advances in media technology, without the 
presence of an election and the concurrent campaign, there is no real imperative for them 
to do so. This will be especially true for those who are not fully engaged in or interested 
in politics.   
 As compression has created a situation in which many states hold contests on the 
same day as others (or in rapid succession), a voter’s exposure to campaigns is uneven, 
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rapid or non-existent. Momentum-based campaigns that count on media coverage of their 
relative success in the horse race are limited to a smaller window of time to enjoy such 
coverage before having to further demonstrate viability in state after state. There is less 
time to compete in more places for candidates and the race comes to a conclusion before 
many voters have even had an opportunity to weigh in with their preference. To the 
extent that this is problematic would be contingent upon the ability of candidates to 
become known to the electorate. Are voters able to familiarize themselves with 
candidates in a way that allows for healthy electoral competition or has compression so 
altered the dynamic of the nomination contest that those candidates not widely known 
prior to the campaign are not able to be presented to the public as an alternative to more 
widely known front-runners? 
 I explore this idea by investigating two similar campaigns and candidacies that 
took place under very different electoral circumstances. The 1984 Democratic 
nomination contest, which saw the rise of then little-known Colorado Senator Gary Hart 
to challenge the presumptive Democratic nominee and former Vice President Walter 
Mondale, is the paradigm of a front-runner v. insurgent campaign in the back-loaded era. 
I contrast this historic campaign for the nomination with that of the 2008 Republican 
contest. In that contest, lesser-known Governors from Arkansas and Massachusetts 
emerged with momentum from results in Iowa and New Hampshire to challenge the 
mistake, prone favorite and 2000 nomination runner-up, John McCain in the most 
compressed electoral environment of the post-reform era. The inferences drawn from the 
study of and contrasts between these two historic campaigns should provide valuable 
insight into the familiarity of candidates to voters in these different environments. 
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Understanding that the electoral environments are much different for the Democrats in 
1984 and Republicans in 2008, the comparison is still apt given what is being 
investigated. Chapter 3 illustrates there is no significant connection with the status of an 
incumbent president and the decisions made by candidates to enter the nomination race. It 
is therefore not theoretically problematic that the Democratic nominee was to face a 
Republican incumbent in the 1984 general election, and the 2008 Republican contest was 
to hold the White House after two terms of incumbency. The candidates are still seeking 
to introduce themselves to the voters regardless of who the president is or which party is 
in power. When examining compression and voter familiarity, it is reasonable to assume 
that the behavior of candidates and the way in which voters become familiar with 
candidates should be unaffected by the larger context of the campaign. 
1984 Democratic Nomination Contest 
 After the Carter insurgency of 1976 showed the way forward for momentum-
based challengers but before compression began to alter the calendar there was the 1984 
Democratic nomination. This contest provides an intriguing opportunity to study voter 
familiarity with candidates in a back-loaded contest. This race featured a well-known 
front-runner and party stalwart in former Vice President Walter Mondale; a well-known 
challenger in former astronaut and U.S. Senator from the electorally important state of 
Ohio, John Glenn; an ideological attention-seeking candidate Reverend Jesse Jackson; 
and what came to be the quintessential dark horse insurgent candidate in Gary Hart.  
These candidates, along with a few peripheral figures, competed for the nomination in an 
electoral environment in which there was more than a month between the Iowa caucuses 
and the New Hampshire primary, no more than four states ever held contests on the same 
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date, and a majority of the delegates were awarded in contests held in May and June, with 
the nominating convention in July.  
 From the survey responses in the 1984 NES rolling cross section surveys, Bartels 
(1988) demonstrated that the public became more familiar with Gary Hart after he 
received favorable media coverage in the wake of the Iowa caucuses. I utilize this same 
data to examine how familiar respondents who were not yet exposed to the direct efforts 
of any campaign were with the 1984 Democratic candidates. The results of this analysis 
are shown in Figure 5.1.  
 Beginning with the initial results of the survey, two weeks prior to the Iowa 
caucuses, the ability of voters to rate (either positively or negatively) the candidates for 
the Democratic nomination are recorded weekly. As contests occur, respondents from 
those states are removed from the data and only responses in states yet to vote are 
recorded.   
 As can be observed in Figure 5.1, the candidates do not have a universal starting 
point. John Glenn, Jesse Jackson, Walter Mondale and the party’s nominee in 1972, 
George McGovern, all enter the race familiar to more than 90% of the electorate.  After 
finishing in a surprising second position in the Iowa caucuses Gary Hart is able to 
achieve relative parity with those candidates in short order. After the 8th week of the 
survey, Hart is able to sustain himself as a top-tier candidate on par with those more 
famous politicians. By the 8th week Alan Cranston, Earnest Hollings and Reubin Askew 
had all left the race after failing to achieve the notoriety that Hart was able to achieve 
after his momentum generating campaign placed him prominently in front of the voting 
public.  
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Figure 5.1 
1984 Democratic Candidate Familiarity Amongst the Remaining Electorate 
 
 
 Earnest Hollings and Reubin Askew risked their political careers, collected 
millions of dollars in contributions, took part in candidate forums and debates, competed 
in early state primaries and caucuses, and then exited the nomination race before a 
significant portion of the American electorate was even aware of who they were. Former 
Astronaut and U.S. Senator John Glenn despite his standing as an American hero and 
Senator from Ohio, was not able to parlay his familiarity with voters into electoral 
success. Gary Hart’s campaign did not suffer from his initial lack of recognition amongst 
voters as his star shone very brightly after relative success in Iowa and began what was 
essentially a three candidate race between himself former Vice President Walter Mondale 
and Reverend Jesse Jackson for the duration (Parent et al. 1987).  
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 Taken in isolation, the tracking of familiarity with candidates amongst survey 
respondents prior to the selection contests in their states reveals a slight gap in knowledge 
of the front-runner and of a key electoral challenger. Gary Hart reaches relative parity 
with Walter Mondale after a few weeks, in a back-loaded contest, such as the one in 1984, 
there was ample opportunity for voters to hear about the campaign and candidates after 
the early state contests. It is still potentially impactful on a race when a challenger is so 
much less familiar to voters than the front-runner. In this case well-known challengers 
like John Glenn are winnowed from the field after setbacks in early states and the 
competition evolved into a showdown between a well-known candidate, and one that 
voters were becoming familiar with over the course of the primary. Voters make up their 
minds at different stages, and there is a chance that some made up their minds to support 
a known commodity like Mondale before they were aware of his principal challenger.  
 Considering that respondents are making up their minds at times of relative 
uncertainty and with incomplete information, a voter can establish a preference for a 
candidate before being fully aware of potential alternatives. A front-runner is established 
during the invisible primary season, and despite the dynamics of the campaign and the 
results of the sequential elections, front-runners tend to win nominations whereas 
momentum-based candidates tend to finish second (Norrander 2006).  Does this decision 
to support a front-runner potentially close off or make a voter less likely to explore 
alternatives? If so then the structure of the race would not matter. Momentum candidates 
would be faced with the prospect of introducing themselves to an electorate with a 
preference. 
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 Examining the respondents to the 1984 NES that reported on a preference for one 
of the Democratic candidates in that cycle, I utilize a probit regression model in which 
support for Walter Mondale as the Democratic nominee (prior to a state’s contest being 
held) serves as the dependent variable. The chief independent variable is a binary 
measure of whether or not the respondent was able to offer a rating of Gary Hart on a 
feeling thermometer. A statistically significant negative association of this variable would 
indicate that respondents are expressing their preference for the front-runner without even 
cursory knowledge of that candidate’s chief rival. Control variables are included to 
account for the political predispositions, campaign exposure and demographic 
characteristics of the respondents.   
 Interest in the campaign is reported on a three-point scale of very interested to not 
at all interested. Ideology is measured on a five-point scale ascending with the 
conservatism of the individual. A media variable accounting for the number of days in a 
week the respondent watched national television news regarding the campaign is 
included to account for exposure. A binary variable for race was included, with 1 being 
white and 0 equating to other racial identities36. A similar binary variable was used for 
gender with 1 equating to male and 0 used to indicate female. The income variable is an 
11-point scale advancing by $5,000 after the initial $10,000 threshold is cleared. The 
results of the probit regression analysis are reported below in Table 5.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  White and non-white was chosen as there were several state contests in which there were no respondents 
identified as black 
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Table 5.1 
1984 Democratic Nomination Mondale Supporters Familiarity with Challenger 
 	   Mondale	  Support	  VARIABLES	   logit	  coefficient	  Familiar	  w/	  Hart	   -­‐0.177**	  	   (0.0829)	  Interest	   0.0746**	  	   (0.0364)	  Ideology	   0.0400**	  	   (0.0157)	  TV	  News	   0.0132	  	   (0.00979)	  White	   -­‐0.135*	  	   (0.0782)	  Male	   -­‐0.00698	  	   (0.0489)	  Income	   -­‐0.0285***	  	   (0.00711)	  Constant	   -­‐0.595***	  	   (0.135)	  	   	  Observations	   3,129	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	  
 
 The significant negative association between Mondale support and familiarity 
with Gary Hart indicates that a portion of Mondale supporters in 1984 were not aware of 
their party’s principal alternative for the nomination. Interest in the campaign, lower 
levels of income and relative political conservatism were also associated with Mondale 
support.  This leaves the impression that Hart, who was a favorite of the liberal wing of 
the Democratic Party, was not even known to many of Mondale’s supporters. A 
candidate such as Gary Hart with liberal economic policy preference might well have had 
a message that resonated with a lower-income electorate if they had become aware of his 
candidacy in time.  
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 What is clear from tracking the familiarity of candidates across those crucial 
twelve weeks in 1984 is that Gary Hart’s supporters were almost certainly aware of the 
front-runner Walter Mondale who was known by 95.3% of the electorate two weeks 
before the initial contest in Iowa while a significant portion of Walter Mondale’s 
supporters were not award of Gary Hart who was known only by 43.06% of respondents 
two weeks prior to the Iowa Caucuses. The logistic regression results indicate that there 
were a significant amount of Mondale supporters who chose him without being at all 
familiar with the most viable alternative to his nomination.  
 An alternative history of the 1984 Democratic nomination is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, however, in a race as close as that contest one can credibly wonder if the 
outcome might have been different had more of Mondale’s supporters been willing or 
able to know about the candidacy of Gary Hart before their states contest was held. With 
only 32% of the delegates determined before April in 1984 and the relative quickness in 
which Hart reached parallel levels of familiarity with Mondale the structure of the race 
does not seem prohibitive.  
 Perhaps Mondale was simply that dynamic a figure that he won many Democrats 
over very quickly. Hart had an opportunity to introduce himself to the electorate and to 
possibly win the nomination. He was able to compete in every primary and caucus 
through June and into July’s convention. Any blame as to his inability to become known 
to voters interested enough to support a candidate in a Democratic nomination campaign 
might well rest with him and not with the structure of the primary calendar.  
 While we can’t know how the Democratic nomination contest of 1984 would 
have turned out in a different electoral environment with a more compressed calendar we 
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can consider the case of the 2008 Republican nomination, and the plight of Mitt Romney 
and Mike Huckabee trying to become familiar to the voters as they ran against the well-
known party runner-up from the previous nomination campaign Senator John McCain.  
2008 Republican Nomination Contest 
 The 2008 nomination calendar was the most compressed in history. The Iowa 
caucuses took place on January 3, 2008, followed five days later by the New Hampshire 
primary. There were 28 primaries and caucuses held prior to February 20th of that year37. 
The dynamics of such a compressed race would make it difficult for candidates who were 
not well-funded or initially well-known to utilize a momentum-based strategy in the way 
a less well known candidate could have a quarter century earlier. This did not stop a 
substantial and diverse field of Republican candidates from entering the race however.  
 Competing in this highly compressed environment were the former mayor of New 
York City, Rudolph Giuliani, who had gained a level of notoriety and reverence from the 
American electorate for the way in which he managed the crisis in that city in the 
immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. He was running against 
Senator John McCain of Arizona, who had been the party’s runner up in the last 
competitive primary of 2000, and as such the favorite to capture the nomination in 200838.  
The field also included two recent governors, Mitt Romney of Massachusetts and Mike 
Huckabee of Arkansas, both of whom had a growing appeal in the party though from 
different ideological constituencies (Southwell 2010).  
 Utilizing data from the rolling cross-sectional 2008 National Annenberg Election 
Survey, it is possible to examine the familiarity of candidates over time in much the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  February 20, 1984 was the date of the Iowa caucuses.	  38	  Every Republican Presidential nominee since 1980 who has been a previous runner up for the party’s 
nomination and run in the subsequent cycle has received the nomination.  
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fashion as in 198439.  Beginning the analysis two weeks prior to the Iowa caucuses and 
advancing 12 weeks.40I track the ability of respondents in states that have not yet held 
their selection contests to rate the candidate (either positively or negatively) in a standard 
feeling thermometer. The results of the analysis are provided in Figure 5.2.  
 
Figure 5.2 
2008 Republican Candidate Familiarity Amongst the Remaining Electorate 
 
 Compared with the 1984 Democrats, all the candidates in this analysis are 
entering the field with a good deal of initial familiarity to voters. This is despite the 
survey period being advanced two months earlier by the compression of the race. All five 
of the major candidates are entering the critical period of the race familiar to more than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Data is limited to the five candidates listed in Figure 5.2 40	  The time that it took for Gary Hart to achieve relative voter familiarity parity with Walter Mondale in 
1984 
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80% of respondents. Giuliani and McCain, by virtue of their national status, are both at or 
near 95% familiarity for the duration of the race. The other candidates, after a slight dip 
when the early states are removed from the analysis, see a steady rise. Though nothing as 
meteoric as Hart’s 1984 surge and never reaching parity with front-runner John McCain. 
Despite his familiarity with voters, Giuliani was winnowed from the field in short order 
after early electoral stumbles (much more quickly than a similarly well-known John 
Glenn was in 1984).  
 Despite a victory for Huckabee in Iowa and an impressively close second place 
finish by Romney in New Hampshire four days later, neither is able to become familiar to 
even 90% of the subsequent electorate and reached relative parity with John McCain. No 
time exists for a “Post-Iowa saturation” in the compressed calendar. There are too many 
contests and opportunities for new media narratives to emerge.  The presence of Super 
Tuesday serves as the defacto end of the 2008 contest. Four weeks after Super Tuesday, 
John McCain is the only Republican left in the field. Had Romney or Huckabee 
continued their campaigns and emerged from those contests more familiar to subsequent 
voters there were not delegates at stake in subsequent contests left to decide the 
nomination in their favor. The compressed 2008 Republican nomination came to a 
conclusion with the Mitt Romney, the candidate having accumulated the second-most 
delegates out of the race after six weeks of electoral competition, and still unknown to 
11% of respondent in subsequent voting states. Mike Huckabee, the winner of the Iowa 
caucuses and seven other contests dropped out of the race four weeks after Super 
Tuesday still unfamiliar to 13% of the remaining electorate.  
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 The tracking of candidate familiarity shows a slight gap between key challengers 
and the front-runner over the course of the campaign. The campaign itself comes to a 
more rapid conclusion in 2008 than it did in 1984. Despite success in early states, 
challengers are never able to reach a state of relative parity with the front-runner, even 
though they begin with high initial levels of familiarity relative to the previous era. To 
consider if this approximately 10% gap in familiarity is in anyway impactful requites an 
analysis of the front-runners support. This can be especially true in 2008 when there is a 
Democratic Primary happening concurrently.  
 I did not control for party in this analysis because of the preponderance of open 
primaries in 2008. 17 contests in which a voter was not required to have any prior 
declared party affiliation fell within the 12-week period of this analysis. Further, John 
McCain owed a decisive level of support in the state of New Hampshire to self-described 
Democrats (Donovan and Hunsaker 2009). It is more appropriate to control for ideology 
and interest in the subsequent analysis than to artificially restrict the tracking of 
familiarity to Republican partisans.  
 I employ a nearly identical analysis of respondents who describe themselves as 
supporters of John McCain in the 2008 ANES as the 1984 Democratic analysis of 
Mondale supporters. I once again utilize a pair of probit regression models in which 
support for John McCain as the Republican nominee prior to a state’s contest being held 
serves as the dependent variable. The chief independent variable is a binary measure as to 
whether or not the respondent was able to offer a rating of Mike Huckabee and of Mitt 
Romney on a feeling thermometer. I have recoded the previously used to measures to 
look identical to their 1984 counterparts for means of more accurate comparison. The two 
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differences between variables are in the income measure and the television viewing. The 
threshold has increased increments of $10,000 as opposed to $5,000 in an 11-point scale. 
The television-viewing question in the 2008 ANES survey asks the respondent how many 
days they have watched news related to the campaign. This includes cable and local news 
where as the 1984 question asked specifically about nightly network news. Results are 
reported in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 
2008 Republican Nomination McCain Supporters Familiarity with Challengers 
 
 McCain 
Support 
McCain 
Support 
VARIABLES Logit coefficient Logit coefficient 
Familiar w/ Huckabee  -0.0702 
  (0.0457) 
Familiar w/ Romney -0.167***  
 (0.0624)  
Interest 0.0327 0.0556*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0201) 
Ideology 0.169*** 0.125*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0125) 
TV News 0.0321*** 0.0379*** 
 (0.00719) (0.00565) 
White 0.171*** 0.179*** 
 (0.0605) (0.0464) 
Male 0.112*** 0.0996*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0266) 
Income 0.0206** 0.0326*** 
 (0.00841) (0.00648) 
Constant -1.364*** -1.198*** 
 (0.106) (0.0813) 
   
Observations 5,825 9,387 Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	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 Looking the chief independent variable of interest, and just as in the 1984 
Democratic primary there is a statistically significant negative correlation between 
support for the front-runner and familiarity with the principal challenger. Interestingly, 
this is not the case with the other challenger in this race, Governor Huckabee. The more 
ideologically conservative of the three and the least known amongst all respondents of 
the three was not unfamiliar to respondents who were supporting McCain even when 
controlling for ideology. The fact that Huckabee is ideologically distinct from McCain in 
a way that Romney is not might in some ways explain this disparate finding between the 
two.  
Conclusion 
 When contrasting the 1984 Democratic and 2008 Republican nomination contests, 
the most striking observation is that in the more compressed era, the challengers never 
reached the same level of familiarity with respondents. This is in spite of them entering 
the 12-week period of analysis much better known than Gary Hart was in 1984. While the 
difference is slight, in that by week 12 Hart was known by 95% of the subsequent 
electorate and Huckabee was known to approximately 86%, it is important to note that 
there was no week 13 for the Huckabee campaign. The race had come to a conclusion as 
the number of delegates attained by McCain was seen as insurmountable. 
 The probit analysis demonstrates than in both elections there was a significant 
negative association between support for the front-runner and familiarity with the 
principal challenger. The more ideologically conservative and thus distinct Mike 
Huckabee did not suffer from the same lack of recognition amongst respondents who 
supported the candidacy of John McCain as Mitt Romney. This is perhaps because of his 
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ideological distinction from John McCain and the avid support he received from 
conservative Christians especially in the south after his surprising win in the Iowa 
caucuses (Medhurst 2009). The advantages in familiarity that a front-runner acquires 
prior to the nomination contest could not be equaled by a challenger over the course of 
the nomination campaign in the more compressed contest.  
 The front-runner is achieving support from those who are not familiar with 
alternatives in both eras. In a back-loaded contest, familiarity on par with the front-runner 
can be achieved by a challenger prior to a decisive amount of delegates being awarded. 
The compressed environment has produced a more a competitive environment in which 
challengers seeking to benefit from the momentum of early victories are not as familiar to 
the electorate during the definitive portion of the contest as their counterparts in an earlier 
era, despite having more initial familiarity. This is likely due to the great glut of contests 
that occur so early in calendar. Candidates are challenged to campaign in all states 
holding contests on or around Super Tuesday for reasons both financial, and logistical.  
The front-runner benefits from compression to a much greater extent than even well 
known challengers. Candidates seeking to introduce themselves to the electorate are best 
served to do so prior to the first vote being cast. The indication given from the great 
growth of initial familiarity of the 2008 candidates is that they are in fact doing this.  
 The voters are given less time to become familiar with the candidates, though they 
seem able to adjust this changing dynamic remarkably well perhaps due to the more 
active campaign that occurs prior to the first contests, they have a greater initial level of 
familiarity with the candidates than the respondents of 1984. There is still the 10-15% of 
the electorate though who are not able to be persuaded by a candidate’s campaign as they 
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are not familiar with them by the time the race concludes. This was not a decisive amount 
of the electorate in 2008. In 1984, however, it was not even a concern as the lengthy 
campaign allowed ample time for voters to become familiar with a challenger the caliber 
of Gary Hart. Future elections in this compressed era might find this issue of candidate 
familiarity problematic in a narrowly decided contest. 
 John McCain defeated two challengers who were not able to parlay their early 
state momentum into sustained success and electoral familiarity on par with his. Would 
this have been the case if there were weeks and months for the press to have waxed on 
about the results from Iowa and New Hampshire primary ? It is impossible to know. 
Though even if a small fraction of voters are not familiar with one of candidates in the 
race by its conclusion there is a normative concern that the race for the nomination has 
not been a truly representative expression of the popular will, of the party faithful . This 
would make the campaign less determinative in favor of the invisible primary. An elite 
process that involves the acquisition or resources, endorsements and attention outside of 
public view. The very thing the McGovern-Fraser reforms of 1972 sought to move away 
form. 
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CHAPTER VI  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The process for nominating presidential candidates by the major parties is a 
dynamic one, and requires consistent evaluation from scholars when structural changes 
are made to it. Change is constant and ongoing, making evaluation something of a 
moving target. There is more money than ever being raised and spent in nomination 
campaigns, creating pressures on candidates to fundraise and make appeals to motivated 
constituencies. Frontloading of contests grew every year between 1984 and 2008 with 
very little structured opposition from either major party’s central committee. More and 
more states have clustered on Super Tuesday. The common linkage amongst all of these 
phenomena is that of compression. The portion of the nomination race in which voters 
must decide between alternatives has been compressed into a period of less than three 
months.  
 I have offered a look at how the compression of the nomination calendar has 
impacted the behavior of states, the entrance of candidates into the race, and the 
familiarity that voters have with the candidates for the nomination. In this pursuit I offer 
some provocative findings that will serve as the basis for future scholarly inquiry on the 
subject.  
 The states themselves benefit from moving their contests forward. When looking 
at the disbursements of dollars from the campaign committee’s of candidates for the 
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nomination of both major parties into the states, there is shown a direct financial benefit 
to moving a state’s contest up relative to the initial contest from the previous cycle. This 
benefit is not universal. States that hold caucuses as opposed to a primary are in a more 
precarious position and going alone, or holding their contest on the ever crowding Super 
Tuesday is negatively correlated with candidate disbursements in those states. The states, 
which receive very minimal guidance from the party, are ultimately in charge of when to 
hold a contest and what type of contest to hold. The demonstrably greater financial 
commitment offered to them by the campaigns, shows that their movement is logical, and 
based on real and tangible incentives. 
 States being self-interested actors have every reason to move a contest earlier. 
There is a preponderance of historical experience suggesting that a competitive campaign 
cannot reliably be expected to continue past Super Tuesday. Large delegate rich states 
benefit and states that hold primaries on Super Tuesday see increased attention from 
candidates along with the intangible or contextual benefits associated with that attention. 
 The movement of large states to the front of the nomination calendar, the huge 
numbers of delegates at stake on Super Tuesday, and the cost associated with 
electioneering in such an environment have been criticized as creating a defacto national 
primary. Through a case study analysis of the 1984 Democratic and 2008 Republican 
campaigns, I have illustrated that these critiques of the system have grown in the quarter 
century between the two campaigns as state and candidate behavior have adjusted to the 
structure.  
 One critique of such a system speaks to a lack of representativeness. The need for 
vast financial resources favors, well-known and financially connected, national 
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politicians. The need to connect to the electorate, in terms of retail politics is diminished 
and isolated to the early states of Iowa and New Hampshire. If small states outside of 
New Hampshire and Iowa can only benefit from moving to the same day, and holding 
more costly primaries instead of party caucuses, then it raises the question as to the value 
of those states at the beginning of the process?. There is no other observable way for 
other small states to be impactful in their own right.   
 The normative critiques of this system are vast, but the results here point to the 
lack of incentive for change on behalf of a key constituency: the states. The party 
committee’s can and have altered the system in the past. The impetus to do so does not 
come from an innate sense of fairness, but rather some measure of political expediency.  
These types of changes have to be done at the national convention, which are politically 
staged events meant to demonstrate party unity for the benefit of the candidate’s general 
election campaign. Candidates, who have successfully navigated this type of system, are 
not likely to risk the optics of a floor fight, and create a potentially easier path for an 
intraparty challenge four years later, for an abstract principal like providing more equity 
in the nomination system. The parties themselves must see a compelling reason to make 
these changes because the states will not, and there is no reason to expect leadership from 
the candidates on the issue either.  
 The parties cannot prevent candidates from entering the race at any point they see 
fit do so. Candidates can make such a choice for themselves when they perceive the 
existence of a strategic advantage. The results of the analysis presented in the fifth 
chapter show that a structural factors like compression, and the dynamics of the race are 
not a significant determinant of when this occurs. What was significant was the 
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candidate’s divergence from the mean party ideology, and their lack of an existing 
constituency to respond to, and be held accountable by.  
 Ideological candidates not constrained by office are entering the race before 
moderates and successful politicians. How might this impact the rhetoric of, and conduct 
of other candidates in a race? There is activist energy, especially in early state contests 
that can be capitalized on. Even if these candidates do not win the nomination, they must 
alter the race in such a way that reverberates into the future. One needs look no further 
than the 2004 Democratic contest. Howard Dean, the liberal governor of Vermont upon 
leaving office was campaigning for the Democratic nomination more than two full 
months before serving United States Senator John Kerry, allowing him to fully dedicate 
time and resources to the endeavor. Dean rose to party front-runner for a time thanks in 
part, to positioning himself much closer to the anti-war left. Senator Kerry facing many 
votes on appropriations for the war in Iraq, and a highly publicized vote for the 
authorization of the use of force, was placed in a much more difficult position. Kerry had 
to explain his position with the party base in the early primary states, while responsibly 
helping to govern the nation and its interests. His nuanced position was reduced to a 
binary choice made in a 2002 vote by many in the Democratic party, and his clumsy 
attempts to critique both the Republican president and his Democratic rivals in an Iowa 
town hall, helped to establish the “flip-flopper” narrative employed against him by the 
Bush campaign.  
 While compression did not show itself to be determinative to a candidates 
decision when to enter the race, it is no less interesting that early entry is driven by 
ideological candidates. Early candidates might well be as important as early states, 
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depending on the traction they gain with the electorate. Not determinative in the outcome, 
but in the way in which they shape the race.  
 We also cannot know who decides not to run as a result of the compression of the 
nomination calendar. Governors and Senators who still have goals they wish to achieve in 
their current office might be disincentiveised to pursue the White House, knowing the 
time demands and financial realities that are involved are made more difficult, by the 
presence of more candidates in the race. Further study in regards to candidate entry must 
involve a systematic concurrent analysis of would be candidates as well as eventual 
candidates.  
 Finally, the results of this analysis of primary compression, shows a small 
difference in the familiarity of candidates between voters of different eras. In 1984, Gary 
Hart and Walter Mondale reached relative parity in their familiarity with remaining 
voters after nine weeks of analysis in which 10 contests had occurred.  In 2008, Mike 
Huckabee and Mitt Romney never reached parity with John McCain, or came within five 
points of doing so before they conceded the race. This gap while small, is still troubling 
in that it represents a built in systemic advantage for a front-runner and diminishes the 
impact of momentum offered by voters subject to a campaign, once the race has begun.  
 Using the most back-loaded contest in which existing data was available for, and 
the most compressed race in the history of the nomination as case studies, there is shown 
a persistent problem of front-runner support being rewarded without full knowledge of 
the alternatives in both instances. This problem is of greater concern in a compressed 
environment when there is less time available for a candidate to build his or her own base 
of support. If the party base has already begun to coalesce around a front-runner and is 
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not receptive to an alternative, then a strategic candidate can seek to expand their base of 
support. Compression would seem to have limited the possibilities of doing this as the 
campaign moves to a rapid conclusion.  
 This dissertation has shown that compression is driven by the states, and largely a 
benefit to those states most responsible for it. The candidates in an era of growing 
compression who involve themselves in running for the nomination earlier, are more 
ideological and less likely to hold office than their forbearers. The voters themselves who 
are offered a reduced time frame for a campaign for the nomination have adjusted, by 
becoming familiar with candidates earlier in the process and not merely awaiting the 
results of early states to become informed. There are still a number of voters who are not 
sufficiently familiar with their alternatives when the campaign concludes, and many of 
them offer support for the front-runner despite this.  
 Taken in its entirety compression benefits well-financed, well-known candidates 
that can compete in the early states and quickly pivot to larger more expense states. Large 
delegate rich states and states that move their vote early benefit from the system as well, 
by receiving greater attention from the candidates, while voters are doing a remarkable 
job in keeping up. The cost incurred by compression comes at the expense of momentum-
based challengers who struggle parlay their early state success with parallel familiarity to 
the front-runners, and to small caucus holding states seeking a strategically advantageous 
date for their contest.  
  It is not shocking that compression persists as this system has been constructed 
by, and most greatly benefits those who have the greatest opportunity, and least incentive 
to change it. It took the exogenous shock of violent anti-war protests in 1968 to spur the 
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Democratic Party leaders to institute the McGovern-Fraser reforms that sought a more 
representative system. Forty years of self-interested positioning amongst key actors has 
ironically altered the system to in many ways benefit well-financed candidates with elite 
support before the race commences. If compression continues unabated in a way that 
causes the voter to become less familiar with, and perhaps ultimately unsatisfied with 
their nominee, then perhaps it will be the party base once again that demands change.   
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 In my analysis on candidate disbursements in states, I created a dataset using 
information provided by the Federal Elections Commission Primary Expenditures Report 
for each cycle from 1976 through 2008. For candidates utilizing federal matching funds 
an addendum to this report entitled “State-by-State Disbursements” was used for the 
period of time in which the candidate’s principal campaign committee was in existence, 
until such time as the nomination campaign officially came to a close at the nominating 
convention. For candidates who did not opt to utilize the federal matching funds available 
to them I utilized their “Campaign Finance Disclosure Year-End Report” to group each 
disbursement by state over the course of their campaign for the nomination.  
 
The Following Candidates opted out of Public Financing and were categorized in such a 
way: 
1980 John Connelly 
1996 Steve Forbes 
2000 George W. Bush 
2000 Steve Forbes 
2004 Howard Dean 
2004 John Kerry 
2008 Hillary Clinton 
2008 Barack Obama 
2008 Bill Richardson 
2008 Rudolph Giuliani 
2008 Mike Huckabee 
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2008 John McCain 
2008 Ron Paul 
2008 Mitt Romney 
2008 Fred Thompson 
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   Fall 2011, Spring 2012, Fall 2012, Spring 2013, Fall 2013, Spring 2014 
 
MANUSCRIPT REVIEWS  
 
American Politics Research 
 
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE 
  
w/Dr. John Bruce, Fall 2010 
 Collected and coded data related to state house apportionment from 2005 through 2009 
 
Inter-University Consortium For Political and Social Research, Summer Program in Quantitative Methods, 
Summer 2011 
 Studied Panel Data, Advanced Regression Analysis, and Matrix Algebra 
 
DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE 
 
Political Science Department Orientation Academic Advisor, University of Mississippi 
 Academic Year 2012 
 
Teaching Assistant, University of Mississippi  
  POL 101: Introduction to American Politics, Fall 2010, Spring 2011 
 
National Election Poll, Exit Pollster 
 General Election 2012, 2014 
 
AP Reader for the College Board 
 American Government, Summer 2014, Summer 2015 
 
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 
 
Acting Deputy Director, Durham County (NC) Board of Elections 2015 
 
Coordinator of the Weatherization Assistance Program, Washtenaw County (MI) Employment Training 
and Community Services, 2006-2010 
 
Congressional Intern, District Office of the Honorable John D. Dingell (MI-15) Spring & Summer 2005 
 
LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY 
 
German (intermediate); Lithuanian (basic) 
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PAPERS IN PROGRESS 
 
“Presidential Ideology and Staff Construction: A Dynamic Examination of Professional Loyalty from Nixon 
through Bush” 
With Dr. Salvatore Russo 
 
“Structural Incentives and the Invisible Primary” 
 
CONFRENCE PRESENTATIONS 
  
“ Learning from Iowa: How Voters Update Perceptions in Response to Early Primaries” 
With John Dudley and Dr. Michael Henderson 
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, January 2014 
 
“ The Killing (Corn) Fields: The Implication of Institutionalized Early Primary Contests” 
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association, March 2013  
 
“ Progressive Presidential Ambition in the Contemporary United States Senate”   
Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, January 2012 
 
 
GRANTS & AWARDS 
 
Instructor Fellowship, University of Mississippi 2014– 2015 
  
Graduate Assistantship, University of Mississippi 2010 – 2014 
 
Induction into Pi Alpha Alpha Honor Society for Graduate Students of Public Affairs and Administration, 
2007, Eastern Michigan University  
 
Transfer Scholarship for Achievement, 2001, Western Michigan University 
                             
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS 
  
American Society for Public Administration, 2005 to present 
American Political Science Association, 2008 to present 
Southern Political Science Association, 2011 to present 
The Academy of Political Science, 2012 to present 
 
